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Article 
The Incidental Regulation of Policing 
Seth W. Stoughton†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In his groundbreaking 1968 study, James Q. Wilson de-
scribed how a law enforcement agency’s “style” is influenced by 
the local political environment.1 In a passing parenthetical, 
Wilson noted that police practices “may be affected in unin-
tended ways by various political actions, but that is another 
matter.”2 The study of legal decisions that affect policing even 
though they are made without policing in mind has largely re-
mained “another matter” ever since. Scholars have focused 
their attention on laws that are centrally concerned with polic-
ing3
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 or have looked beyond law altogether to the many sublegal 
 1. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGE-
MENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 1–4 (1968). 
 2. Id. at 231. 
 3. There has been, of course, significant academic attention to laws and 
doctrines that are intended to have some specific effect on police practices. See, 
e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757 (1994) (addressing problems with Fourth Amendment doctrine); Yale 
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Ba-
sis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 
(1983) (discussing the theoretical justification for the exclusionary rule); Dan-
iel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreali-
ty, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter 
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507 (2001) (seeking to change the doctrine 
governing consensual encounters).  
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factors that can affect an officer’s decision to take a particular 
action by, for example, making an arrest or using force.4
 
Legal scholars have also identified legal doctrines that, while primarily 
concerned with policing or criminal justice, have unintended and sometimes 
perverse consequences. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 196–281 (2011) (describing how the constitutionalization of 
criminal procedure has precluded judicial review of substantive criminal law 
and raised the costs of legislative action); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Se-
cret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1313 (1994) (arguing that the combination of consti-
tutional criminal procedure and evidence law “create functional—if unintend-
ed—incentives for law enforcers” to commit perjury); John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 
117 (pointing out how the current approach to qualified immunity has inci-
dentally stymied the development of constitutional law and “degrade[d] exist-
ing rights to a least-common-denominator understanding of their meaning”); 
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 372 (2000) (explaining that 
the remedial structure for constitutional torts may increase the incidents of 
violations when the perceived benefits make the monetary costs politically 
salable); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (2006) (describing the perverse impact constitutional pro-
tections can have on the political protections of defendants). No shortage of 
scholars have observed that the sheer number of substantive criminal offenses 
has broadened the reach of the criminal justice system by giving police officers 
broad discretion to selectively stop, search, and arrest and prosecutors the 
power to cherry-pick from a buffet of criminal charges, creating a heightened 
potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See, e.g., DOUGLAS 
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 21, 30–31 
(2008); HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TAR-
GET THE INNOCENT xxxii–xxvii (2009); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” 
and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic 
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 557–59 (1997) (discussing specifical-
ly law enforcement authority to stop people for traffic offenses); Alex Kozinski 
& Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF 
JUSTICE 43, 45–49 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009); William J. Stuntz, The Patho-
logical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001). 
 A 
 4. Race, gender, and education are perhaps the most frequently dis-
cussed sublegal attributes. E.g., James J. Fyfe, Who Shoots? A Look at Office 
Race and Police Shooting, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 367, 369–81 (1981) (race); 
Cara E. Rabe-Hemp, Female Officers and the Ethic of Care: Does Officer Gen-
der Impact Police Behaviors?, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 426 (2008) (gender); Victor E. 
Kappeler et al., Police Officer Higher Education, Citizen Complaints and De-
partmental Rule Violations, 11 AM. J. POLICE 37 (1992) (officer education). 
Scholars have, however, also identified other factors. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (describing the ef-
fect of community perceptions of police legitimacy); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (discussing citizens’ concerns with 
legal authorities); David N. Allen, Police Supervision on the Street: An Analy-
sis of Supervisor/Officer Interaction During the Shift, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 91, 
95–96 (1982) (discussing the role of front-line supervision); James A. Conser, A 
Literary Review of the Police Subculture: Its Characteristics, Impact and Policy 
Implications, 2 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. at 46, 51 (Winter 1980) 
(focusing on the police subculture); Robin Shepard Engel, The Effects of Su-
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small but growing cadre of scholars have begun scrutinizing a 
wider array of legal doctrines, recognizing that the “the law of 
the police” is broader than conventional accounts acknowledge.5 
Thus far, however, these efforts have not distinguished be-
tween laws that are directed at changing police behavior—state 
certification requirements, for example, which demand that 
would-be officers satisfy certain criteria6
In this Article, I explore the incidental regulation of polic-
ing in its own right. The law enforcement industry operates not 
in a vacuum, but against a legal backdrop that includes laws 
that encompass police agencies as constituents of a broader 
regulatory ambit, such as rules and regulations aimed at local 
government entities and employers. Even when these laws are 
explicitly intended to reach police, they are not necessarily in-
tended to affect policing—i.e., how officers act—in specific 
ways. These laws are “policing-neutral,” but they can have a 
profound, if unappreciated, effect on police practices. By influ-
encing policing style, determining enforcement strategy, and 
shaping officer tactics, these laws play a role in the external 
provision of police services, shaping how officers interact with 
civilians. But they also shape the internal environment in 
which officers operate, affecting the dynamic that exists be-
tween line officers and supervisors as well as inter-
departmental relationships. When scholars and reformers dis-
cuss policing behaviors, they often emphasize the symptom 
without engaging with the underlying legal causes. Police prac-
tices, or so I shall argue, are meaningfully responsive to an ar-
ray of laws that do not, on their face, have anything to do with 
policing. Understanding the incidental regulation of policing, 
then, is a necessary prerequisite to understanding and reform-
ing police practices. 
—and laws that have 
an incidental, and often unanticipated, impact on policing. 
 
pervisory Styles on Patrol Officer Behavior, 3 POLICE Q. 262 (2000) (discussing 
the role of front-line supervision); Robin Shepard Engel, Patrol Officer Super-
vision in the Community Policing Era, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 51, 53–54 (2002) (fo-
cusing on supervisory philosophies); Stephen Mastrofski, Policing the Beat: 
The Impact of Organizational Scale on Patrol Officer Behavior in Urban Resi-
dential Neighborhoods, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 343, 351–55 (1981) (identifying organ-
izational dynamics); Douglas A. Smith & Jody R. Klein, Police Control of In-
terpersonal Disputes, 31 SOC. PROBS. 468, 477–79 (1984) (same); Tom R. Tyler, 
Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84 
(2004). 
 5. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
785 (2012). 
 6. Cf. id. at 798 n.145. 
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This Article explores the incidental regulation of policing in 
three parts. In Part I, I define the concept of incidental regula-
tion and describe the potential problems that it raises in the po-
licing context. Unlike the laws that are aimed exclusively or 
primarily at police, laws that have only an incidental regulato-
ry effect may not benefit from a deliberative approach to de-
termining whether the impact on police practices is normative-
ly desirable. Instead, the impact on policing is a side effect, and 
can be entirely unintended. There are reasons to be especially 
chary of unintended consequences in the context of law en-
forcement. Police officers carry—and use—handcuffs, batons, 
and guns, and policing commonly intrudes on sensitive liberty 
and privacy interests. Further, officers play a unique role in 
modern society both explicitly, fulfilling a public safety func-
tion, and implicitly, as uniformed representatives of the exist-
ent social and legal hierarchy. These values are significant 
enough that deliberately modifying the scope of police authority 
or how it is exercised typically gives rise to extended debate. 
Accidental modifications, then, should be even more objectiona-
ble. 
The conventional academic conception of police regulation, 
however, is ill-suited to address the incidental effects of laws of 
general applicability. Current academic work is dominated by 
two complementary perspectives. The first views law as a direct 
regulatory mechanism, and so scholars direct their attention 
primarily at the constitutional doctrines that create conduct 
rules for law enforcement officers, design decision rules that di-
rect courts in their evaluation of officer actions, and fashion the 
scope and contours of remedies available for constitutional vio-
lations. The second largely eschews law, looking instead to the 
non-legal aspects of policing such as the effect of policing phi-
losophies on officer behavior, the way that officers’ arrest deci-
sions are shaped by organizational structure, and the im-
portance of street-level supervision. These conversations are 
important, and they have advanced our understanding of the 
police, but they are incomplete. Rachel Harmon and a few oth-
ers have sought to correct this deficiency by exploring “the body 
of federal, state, local, and even international law that applies 
to police officers and departments and influences what they 
do.”7
 
 7. Id. For example, legal scholars have identified concerns with police 
practices that do not implicate the Constitution, such as the use of informants, 
undercover work, and private policing. In this vein, academic work focuses on 
 In the final section of Part I, I engage with the developing 
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approach by contending that the incidental regulation of polic-
ing is a discrete phenomenon worthy of separate study. 
Part II offers three examples of the incidental regulation of 
policing, drawing on both state and federal law. Local govern-
ment law, which controls geopolitical boundaries and the rela-
tionship between municipalities and counties, can establish a 
competitive dynamic between neighboring police agencies that 
can result in an expansion of high-visibility police services or 
cooperation that lends itself to a regional focus on crime pre-
vention, detection, and investigation. The nature of territorial 
jurisdiction, which limits the geographic area that a particular 
agency is responsible for, can also encourage the adoption of 
specific policing tactics, including intentionally displacing 
crime and disorder into neighboring jurisdictions. State labor 
law that requires or permits collective bargaining also changes 
the police role by emphasizing a legalistic approach to patrol, 
characterized by aggressive criminal enforcement and a high 
number of arrests. It can also be a source of friction within po-
lice agencies, which can negatively affect officer morale and 
performance. And federal race discrimination law, which con-
strains how employers assign job duties, also has the incidental 
effect of inhibiting efforts to improve the public’s perception of 
police legitimacy, particularly in minority communities. When 
the police are viewed as illegitimate, violent crime increases 
and civilian cooperation with the police decreases; both phe-
nomena prompt a negative response from the police them-
selves, changing the way that officers interact with community 
members. 
In Part III, I propose a three-part approach to addressing 
the potential problems of incidental regulation: laws that exert 
an incidental regulatory effect on policing must be identified, 
those effects must be evaluated, and appropriate corrective 
measures must be taken. Each step presents its own challeng-
es. Forecasting the effects of law on the police is plausible in 
some cases, as increased scrutiny of proposed legislation could 
 
the subconstitutional law, or the lack of law, governing police. See, e.g., 
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION 
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009) (informants); Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Dam-
age? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1161–73 (2009) (informants); Elizabeth E. Joh, Break-
ing the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 155, 159 (2009) (undercover operations); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox 
of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 90–93 (2004) (privately 
contracted police). 
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enable lawmakers to forecast, to some extent, a law’s likely im-
pact on police practices, but procedural changes that would 
drive such scrutiny are challenging and predictions can be no-
toriously unreliable. A more robust post-enactment review may 
be appropriate in many cases, and a growing body of research 
could suggest correlates that are particularly likely to affect po-
licing, as well as certain effects that are likely to be particularly 
strong or weak. Once a law’s incidental effects are recognized, 
we can engage in normative evaluation by making an informed 
decision about whether the law should encourage a particular 
police behavior. If it should, we may simply accept the result or 
perhaps even take steps to reinforce it. If, on the other hand, 
the law pushes officers to act in an undesirable way, two sepa-
rate corrective measures may be appropriate: police-specific 
carve-outs could exempt police from generally applicable laws, 
either in part or in whole; and independent offsets could seek to 
compensate for the effects of incidental regulation through law 
or policy without upsetting the existent legal background. The 
concept of carve-outs and offsets are familiar ones, both with 
regard to policing and in other areas of law, but their use as 
mechanisms to mitigate the effects of incidental regulation has 
yet to be fully explored. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF INCIDENTAL REGULATION   
In this Part, I explore the concept of incidental regulation 
of policing, identifying the problems that can arise when polic-
ing-neutral laws impact police practices, which both implicate 
core social values and affect the functional and expressive role 
that police play in modern society.8
 
 8. This is not to say that laws of general applicability are unproblematic 
in other areas of law or in society more generally. The first person to take a 
systematic approach to incidental regulation was not a legal scholar, after all, 
but a sociologist. See Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of 
Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 894–98 (1936). In this Part, I 
contend that the unique aspects of policing, factors that establish what we 
might call “police exceptionalism” provide particularly pressing reasons to be 
wary about the incidental regulation of policing, but one need not go so far. If 
you agree with the proposition that police practices and tactics are im-
portant—a proposition that seems relatively uncontroversial in light of the ac-
ademic and popular attention given to the subject—then identifying the inci-
dental regulation of policing, which can dramatically affect those practices and 
tactics, is worthy of study. One can accept this intermediate conclusion with-
out necessarily agreeing with my broader premise that the incidental regula-
tion of policing is more concerning than incidental regulation in some number 
of other areas. 
 I then describe how focus-
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ing on incidental regulation complements conventional legal 
scholarship. 
Before diving too deeply into my argument, I first want to 
clarify what I mean by “incidental regulation” and “policing-
neutral” laws, and perhaps the easiest way to do that is to ex-
plain what they are not. Police agencies and individual officers 
are subject to a number of legal rules and restrictions that exist 
exclusively or primarily to regulate police conduct. From the 
“mess” of rules that make up the Fourth Amendment doctrines 
that govern searches and seizures9 to state laws establishing 
officer certification requirements,10 judicial and legislative law-
makers direct a significant amount of effort at shaping police 
behavior. Each of the resulting laws has, and is intended to 
have, a specific impact on policing.11 But police agencies and of-
ficers are also subject to laws that have a broader regulatory 
scope than the law enforcement industry, laws that are not in-
tended to have any particular effect on policing practices. Some 
of these laws, such as state labor laws that govern public sector 
collective bargaining, are certainly intended to encompass po-
lice—law enforcement as an industry—but they are often not 
intended to affect policing—how officers act as they perform 
their unique functions. These laws are policing-neutral, and 
their effect on policing is incidental to their primary purposes.12
 
 9. Roger Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973). 
 
When I refer to the incidental regulatory effects of policing-
neutral law, then, I mean the unintended but often profound 
ways that certain laws, which happen to include police within a 
 10. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.13 (2013). 
 11. Of course, it is always possible that a law will undermine the effect 
that it was intended to have or simply fail to have the intended effect. See Lev-
inson, infra note 3, at 350–54 (contending that, in some cases, monetary dam-
ages for constitutional torts may actually increase the number of violations); 
Seth W. Stoughton, Note, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory 
Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727, 1729–30 
(2011) (arguing that Gant would do little to narrow the scope or frequency of 
vehicle searches incident to arrest). 
 12. This is not to suggest that law-makers are entirely unaware that po-
licing-neutral laws will have any effect on police practices. At times, law-
makers may support or argue against a policing-neutral proposal because of 
the perceived effects on policing, which may be pointed out by police lobbyists 
or unions. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litiga-
tion: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1400 (2000). Nevertheless, these effects often go unpre-
dicted, and even when predicted they are incidental to the primary purpose of 
the law under consideration. 
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broader regulatory ambit, change officer behaviors in ways that 
are unintended and often entirely unexpected. 
The concept of unintended consequences goes well beyond 
policing, of course. All industries, public and private, are sub-
ject to regulations that go beyond that particular industry; 
teachers and garbage collectors perhaps no less than police of-
ficers. Real world costs and efficiency concerns lead law- and 
policy-makers to engage in wholesale regulation by category, 
and legal scholars largely acknowledge “the law of unintended 
consequences” as the result of unavoidably imperfect infor-
mation about the intersection of complex systems and regulato-
ry mechanisms.13
Police play a unique and important role in modern society. 
They are, in Hobbesian terms, necessary to fulfill the govern-
ment’s role as peacekeeper, enabling social cooperation by 
keeping us from killing each other. In purely practical terms, 
police perform a range of critical functions by advancing public 
safety, controlling disorder, detecting and investigating crimi-
nal violations, apprehending offenders, et cetera. Many, per-
haps most, of these functions inevitably threaten individual 
liberty interests that hold a privileged position in our social and 
legal tradition. As one of the three unalienable rights upon 
which our fledging country was built,
 To some extent, the concepts in this Article 
may be applied with equal strength in industries other than po-
licing. This paper, then, identifies a specific incidence of a more 
general phenomenon. Nevertheless, I contend that the inci-
dental regulation of policing can be particularly problematic. 
14 the concept of liberty 
remains a core value enshrined in the Bill of Rights and central 
to the concept of justice that criminal procedure doctrines seek 
to protect. Much ink has been spilled over whether the law de-
marcates correctly the boundaries of government power,15
 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 
HOUS. L. REV. 665, 684–88 (2010) (expounding on the role of unintended con-
sequences in policymaking); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Inde-
pendence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 816–18 (2001) (discussing the 
hidden costs of increasing director independence in corporate structures); Wil-
liam P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. 
U.L. REV. 335, 342–46 (2000) (discussing unintended consequences in the con-
text of campaign finance reform); Susan Ness, The Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 531, 532–35 (2006) (discussing the unexpected 
effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act). 
 but 
 14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 15. The various challenges that have been leveled against criminal proce-
dure doctrines are literally too numerous to even attempt to provide a repre-
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few people would contest the assertion that police officers have 
the ability, and at times the obligation, to invade privacy, seize 
property, restrict movement, and inflict injury.16 It is for exact-
ly this reason that police, unlike any other local government 
service, carry handcuffs, batons, and firearms. Policing is 
uniquely and inevitably invasive; the detection and investiga-
tion of many crimes—some more than others—often demands a 
certain amount of intrusion into private spaces, relationships, 
and acts. Police can also intrude into people’s lives in a more 
direct and confrontational way; coercion is an essential element 
of policing.17 Officers are distinctively uniformed, decorated 
with a badge, and visibly armed, all of which serve as a re-
minder of their capacity and authority for violence. The law al-
lows officers to make explicit what is otherwise implicit, to in-
form civilians that non-compliance may be met with force or 
arrest.18 The dynamic of police/civilian encounters reveals itself 
in the way that we talk about it; policing is something that is 
done to someone more often than it is done for or even with 
someone. Where civilians are “consumers” or “customers” of 
many public services—libraries, garbage collection, utilities, 
education, health care, and so on—it would be odd, in many cir-
cumstances, to identify someone as a “consumer” of police ser-
vices. This sense of coercion and inherent threat to liberty in-
terests are functional elements of policing exceptionalism.19
Police also play a unique expressive role, profoundly affect-
ing citizens’ conception of law and order. Community attitudes 
about enfranchisement and the legitimacy of both law and gov-
 
 
sentative sample. They include originalist critiques of broad Fourth Amend-
ment principles to narrow, scientific disputes with specific doctrines. See, e.g., 
Amar, supra note 3, at 801–04 (contending that the elaborate skein of Fourth 
Amendment rules should be replaced with a reasonableness standard); Janice 
Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police Encounters, in OX-
FORD HANDBOOK ON LINGUISTICS AND LAW 326 (Peter M. Tiersma & Law-
rence M. Solan eds., 2012) (challenging the judicial understanding of consent 
in the police context). Relatedly, there is a near-boundless body of work that 
seeks to improve the remedial structure for constitutional violations. See Pot-
ter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1365 (1983) (discussing the criticisms and possible changes to the ex-
clusionary rule). 
 16. E.g., Harmon, supra note 5, at 762. 
 17. See Steinbock, supra note 3, at 554 n.217. 
 18. Cf. id. at 513–14 (describing investigatory stops). 
 19. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1012 (2006) (discussing “criminal law exceptionalism” in 
the separation of powers context). 
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ernment depend heavily on perceptions that are shaped by the 
interactions that civilians have with police officers, particularly 
uniformed patrol officers. To the community, uniformed officers 
are the enforcers of the existing social order. Patrol officers are 
highly visible, local representatives of “the system,” enforcers of 
the existing order, and ambassadors not just for their respec-
tive agencies, but for government, law, and justice more gener-
ally.20 Martin Luther King, Jr., criticized the Birmingham Po-
lice Department, for example, not just because of individual 
malicious acts, but also because he saw them as responsible for 
“preserv[ing] the evil system of segregation.”21 And federal 
grants promote “community policing” by taking officers out of 
patrol vehicles and putting them out on foot, where they can be 
more effective ambassadors by being more accessible to a com-
munity.22
This expressive aspect of policing can have broad real-
world consequences. Tom Tyler, who has written extensively 
about police legitimacy, has concluded that community mem-
bers who view the police as legitimate are more likely to obey 
the law, assist with police activities, and support policies that 
empower the police.
 
23 The inverse is also true; the perception 
that police are illegitimate undermines “the moral right of the 
law to dictate appropriate behavior,”24
 
 20. Alison McKenney Brown, Police as Symbols of Government and Jus-
tice, in POLICE MISCONDUCT 15, 15 (Michael J. Palmiotto ed., 2001). 
 not just the moral right 
of the police to enforce the law’s dictates. Communities that 
have a very low assessment of police legitimacy, and therefore 
distrust the police, are less likely to notify the police of low-
level problems or cooperate with the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of crime; “typical residents in low-income urban 
neighborhoods are extremely reluctant to cooperate with police 
 21. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, and the Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
791, 849 (1993).  
 22. See, e.g., Peter Hermann, City Putting Police Back on Foot Patrol, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 7, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-01-07/ 
news/bal-md.hermann07jan07_1_foot-patrol-police-force-frederick-h-bealefeld 
-iii.  
 23. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 
514 (2003). 
 24. Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legit-
imacy, 4 POLICING 203, 205 (2010). 
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in producing crime reduction strategies.”25 Officers, in turn, are 
more likely to use force and to make an arrest when a suspect 
is uncooperative or antagonistic26 and when the officer per-
ceives the community—not just the individual suspect—as hos-
tile.27 Further, police illegitimacy can itself be criminogenic; 
there are indications that negative perceptions of the police in-
creases violent crime in disadvantaged areas.28 Given higher 
crime and lower cooperation, law enforcement agencies may re-
spond to a lack of community cooperation by unilaterally initi-
ating aggressive “zero tolerance” crackdowns or by under-
policing.29 And some research suggests that officers are also 
more likely to engage in misconduct in disadvantaged commu-
nities.30 The perception that one’s community is besieged by the 
police further decreases police legitimacy, as can the perception 
that the police are ignoring problems in minority neighbor-
hoods.31
 
 25. ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOY-
MENT 103 (2009); cf. Ronald Weitzer, White, Black, or Blue Cops? Race and 
Citizen Assessments of Police Officers, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 313, 321–22 (2000).  
 These actions tend to exacerbate perceptions of police 
 26. Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evi-
dence on Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 23, 24 (William A. Geller & 
Hans Toch eds., 1996). 
 27. Id. at 26. 
 28. See Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of 
Violent Crime in Structurally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 
469, 492 (2005); see also VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF 
BLACK AND LATINO BOYS xv (2011) (concluding that the negative relationship 
that young Black and Latino men have with police leads “many of them to ful-
fill the destiny expected of them” by engaging in “crime and violence”). 
 29. See MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS 45–46, 103–04 
(2009). 
 30. Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 867, 887 (2002). 
 31. Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on 
Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 SOC. RES. 
445, 457–58 (2006) (describing focus group interviews in which Black partici-
pants expressed “a concern with abuse at the hands of police, general 
underpolicing, and then a sense of excessive or heavy-handed response to a 
situation allowed to fester until[] it was out of control”); Harlan Hahn, Ghetto 
Assessments of Police Protection and Authority, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 183, 183 
(1971) (“While many black citizens have complained about harsh or brutal po-
lice behavior, they also have expressed intense criticism of a lack of police pro-
tection.”); KLEIMAN, supra note 29; RIOS, supra note 28, at xiii (describing the 
author’s experience as a college student and former gang member in Oakland, 
CA, writing that “[i]t seemed that police were there selectively, to arrest my 
family and friends for petty acts but not to arrest the main drug dealers and 
victimizers who continued to prey on my community”). 
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illegitimacy, further undermining crime control efforts32
In many ways, society already recognizes the functional 
and expressive values of policing. When legislative, judicial, or 
administrative policy-makers address policing, they do so by 
creating or modifying rules aimed primarily at police, rules di-
rected at changing officer behavior or bolstering police legiti-
macy. Under the typical approach, rules are generated through 
a deliberative process that safeguards, to some extent, the deli-
cate balance between societal and individual interests.
 and 
setting up a feedback loop between a negative community as-
sessment of police, high crime and the police response. 
33 In 
each case, the rule under consideration is intended to impact 
policing in some way, so the policy-making process inherently 
includes an opportunity to evaluate the relative merits and 
drawbacks of the various options under consideration. When 
the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment 
permits officers to make warrantless felony arrests, for exam-
ple, it rejected requiring a warrant or exigent circumstances 
because such a requirement would “hamper effective law en-
forcement.”34 And when a Police Officer Standards and Train-
ing Commission, created by state law and responsible for estab-
lishing the minimum training requirements for officer 
certification,35 decides how much time would-be officers need to 
spend learning about various subjects in the police academy, it 
does so after considering how that training is likely to impact 
officer behavior.36
 
 32. Cf. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why 
Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 231, 233–35 (2008) (arguing effective crime control requires commu-
nity cooperation, which may be obtained by favorable perceptions about the 
institutional legitimacy of police). 
 In both cases, and in many others, the rules 
 33. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Crim-
inal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1322 (1998) (contending that, with regard to 
substantive criminal law, the Supreme Court typically reinforces legislative 
process, but that the Court’s process concerns are reduced in the “absence of 
deliberative legislative choice”). 
 34. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976). Whether the Court 
is the best judge of what constitutes “effective law enforcement” and whether 
it can correctly predict the effects of a particular rule are separate questions. 
For more on the former, see Harmon, supra note 5, at 768–80 (contending that 
constitutional rights are insufficient protection from police intrusion and that 
courts are unable to independently protect constitutional rights). For more on 
the latter, see Seth Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847 (2014). 
 35. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2006, at 7 (2009). 
 36. See Harmon, supra note 5, at 806. 
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that affect the police are drafted with the end effect on policing 
in mind. 
Thus, the lines that delimit police authority are carefully 
drawn, with police given more power than ordinary civilians, 
but less than they might want. When officers act, they do so 
under a mantle of public authority that excuses them from 
many of the civil and criminal laws that are intended to protect 
liberty interests. Where a private citizen would be generally 
subject to civil and criminal sanctions for false imprisonment, 
kidnapping, or battery, the police officer is not only allowed to, 
but expected to infringe on the rights of others by detaining, ar-
resting, and using force.37
This is not necessarily the case with incidental regulation. 
For laws that simply include law enforcement as part of a 
broader regulatory ambit, the effect on policing is a side effect, 
and often an unintended one.
 Yet an officer’s exercise of these pow-
ers is circumscribed by a tangled skein of rules that grant or 
restrict authority only after being hammered into shape 
through the pressures of legislation or litigation. 
38
Despite its importance, incidental regulation has largely 
flown under the radar of conventional scholarship. Scholars 
who touch on policing issues typically do so through a constitu-
 This observation should lead us 
to be suspicious of laws that have an incidental effect on how 
officers go about policing. When an increase or decrease in the 
frequency of arrests, the severity of force, or the measure of po-
lice legitimacy is merely a side effect of some apparently unre-
lated legal decision, it both devalues the interest infringed and 
deprives the police of the democratic legitimacy that would oth-
erwise come from deliberate approval. 
 
 37. In the right circumstances, of course, a private citizen can exercise 
some aspect of police powers; citizen’s arrest remains part of the common law, 
individuals can use force in self-defense, and businesses can take steps, in-
cluding detaining and searching, to protect their property. Nevertheless, it is 
true that police officers can exercise police powers with more latitude than can 
civilians. A police officer, for example, is protected from liability for false ar-
rest if he had probable cause to believe that the subject of the arrest commit-
ted a crime, where a civilian is protected only if a crime has actually been 
committed. Compare, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 836(a)(3) (2014) (giving police of-
ficers authority to arrest when they have “probable cause to believe that the 
person to be arrested has committed a felony”), with CAL. PEN. CODE § 837(3) 
(2014) (giving private persons authority to arrest “[w]hen a felony has been in 
fact committed, and [the private person] has reasonable cause for believing the 
person arrested to have committed it”). 
 38. See infra Part II. 
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tional lens,39 “largely accept[ing] the descriptive claim that 
courts and the Constitution” are “the primary legal mechanism 
for regulating the police,”40 viewing it as “the source most likely 
to supply applicable rules.”41 Practical considerations, it must 
be said, also may push us toward finding constitutional an-
swers to questions of police reform. Since the Warren Court’s 
aggressive development of procedural criminal law,42 the Con-
stitution stands out as a potential one-stop shop for police re-
form, dramatically reducing the transaction costs of regulating 
the more-than-800,000 sworn officers who work at the almost-
18,000 law enforcement agencies across the United States.43
As a few scholars have identified, however, approaching 
police regulation through the lens of constitutional law means 
focusing on some aspects of policing––those regulated by the 
courts, and particularly by the Supreme Court––at the expense 
of others.
 
44 For example, scholars write about consensual en-
counters, searches, stops, arrests, and interrogations, but they 
do not often consider how police officers are selected, trained, 
and equipped; how they go about prioritizing and responding to 
calls for service; or how specialized squads shape the police 
role.45 Constitutional criminal procedure is the bread and but-
ter of legal scholars, but the meat and potatoes of policing do 
not implicate constitutional rights.46 Focusing on constitutional 
regulation thus fails to capture the full extent of police activi-
ties.47
 
 39. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It, supra note 
 It also limits the discussion about the possible mecha-
7, at 159 (“Legal com-
mentary focuses primarily on constitutional criminal procedure.”). 
 40. Harmon, supra 5, at 782. 
 41. George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 
TEX. L. REV. 203, 216 (1975) (“One of the sad but indisputable characteristics 
of the development of legal limitations on law enforcement activity is that it 
compels looking initially to federal constitutional law, the source most likely to 
supply applicable rules.”). 
 42. See, A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 249, 249 (1968) (“[T]here can be little doubt that the [criminal 
law] developments of the [Warren Court] have unalterably changed the course 
of the administration of criminal justice in America.”). 
 43. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 
REAVES, CENSUS], available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf. 
 44. Harmon, supra note 5, at 784–85. 
 45. A growing number of scholars are looking beyond constitutional ques-
tions, but this approach has not yet been widely adopted.  
 46. Cf. DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 86 
(1980) (describing arrest as a relatively infrequent facet of policing). 
 47. This is particularly true when police respond to constitutional pres-
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nisms that could be leveraged to change police behavior, a par-
ticularly thorny aspect of constitutional criminal procedure. 
The exclusionary rule, for example, allows for the suppression 
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, but is limited both by 
its deterrence rationale48 and by the fact that it only comes into 
play during criminal prosecutions.49 Civil liability, theoretically 
available when a police officer infringes on an individual’s fed-
eral statutory or constitutional rights,50 is curtailed by an ex-
pansive qualified immunity doctrine that insulates officers un-
less their actions violate “clearly established” law.51 Const-
itutional torts may be redressed with compensatory damages 
upon a showing of actual harm, and punitive damages are 
available if the deprivation was “wanton and malicious,” but 
the Court has rejected the concept of presumed harms for con-
stitutional violations.52 An individual who suffers only digni-
tary harm––being stopped, searched, or surveilled by police, for 
example, but nothing more––may have difficulty proving actual 
harm,53 leaving open only the possibility of nominal damages. 
And even when substantial damages are a real possibility, in-
dividual officers are likely to be indemnified by their agency or 
local government,54 which may be happy to pay when the mone-
tary costs of a constitutional violation are outweighed by the 
political benefits.55
 
sures by shifting to less regulated practices. Gary T. Marx, The Interweaving 
of Public and Private Police in Undercover Work, in PRIVATE POLICING 172, 
184–86 (Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip C. Stenning eds., 1987) (describing how 
restrictions on police action encourage officers to leverage private partners––
“detectives and informants”––who are “less accountable and not as subject to 
such limitations”). 
 With regard to the scope of both analysis 
 48. Suppression is only warranted in cases where it would deter future 
malfeasance. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–27 (2011). 
 49. See Stoughton, supra note 34, at 881–82 (providing reasons that offic-
ers make arrests other than to formally invoke the criminal justice process). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 51. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 851, 852 (2010). 
 52. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986); Car-
ey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262–64 (1978). 
 53. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to imag-
ine an alternative damages measure that could nonarbitrarily convert these 
types of intangible harms into dollars.”). 
 54. Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1998). 
 55. See Levinson, supra note 3 (“[A] state government that inflicts cruel 
and unusual punishment on prisoners, or violates their free exercise rights, 
may benefit the entire non-prison population by reducing their taxes while 
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and reform efforts, constitutional scholarship provides an in-
complete picture of policing.  
Other scholars, particularly those in sociology and crimi-
nology, focus on the non-legal factors that guide the exercise of 
officer discretion. In what may have been the first study of the 
incidental regulation of policing, James Q. Wilson described 
how the local political environment—political partisanship, the 
size of constituencies, and the professionalism of the head ex-
ecutive—affects officers’ approaches to the patrol function by 
pushing them to prioritize peacekeeping, aggressive crime-
fighting, or responsiveness to community expectations.56 Later 
studies have sought to identify the factors that influence offic-
ers’ behaviors, particularly their decisions to arrest or use force. 
Researchers have identified, inter alia, the police subculture;57 
community perceptions of police legitimacy;58 front-line super-
vision;59 policing philosophies;60 organizational dynamics;61 and 
officer characteristics such as race,62 gender,63 and education,64
This approach captures more of policing than a strictly 
constitutional focus, but it, too, fosters a fragmentary under-
standing of police. Focusing on non-legal factors can, in short, 
put the cart before the horse by exploring the way that social 
factors affect police behavior without recognizing the role of law 
in creating those social factors. Further, recommendations for 
reform at the sublegal level overlook the extent to which those 
factors are shaped by background legal considerations, includ-
ing laws not traditionally or primarily associated with the po-
lice. If, for example, officers with higher education use less 
 
just to name a few.  
 
imposing only costs on the prisoners.”). 
 56. WILSON, supra note 1. Later studies provided some support to his the-
sis, finding that officers in jurisdictions with a professional city manager were 
more likely to adopt a legalistic approach to police patrol. Robert H. 
Langworthy, Wilson’s Theory of Police Behavior: A Replication of the Con-
straint Theory, 2 JUST. Q. 89 (1985). 
 57. E.g., Conser, supra note 4. 
 58. Tom R. Tyler is the leading expert on police legitimacy. See TYLER, 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 4; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra 
note 4; Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 4.  
 59. E.g., Allen, supra note 4; Engel, Effects of Supervisory Styles, supra 
note 4. 
 60. Engel, Patrol Officer Supervision, supra note 4. 
 61. Mastrofski, supra note 4; Smith & Klein, supra note 4. 
 62. E.g., Fyfe, supra note 4. 
 63. E.g., Rabe-Hemp, supra note 4. 
 64. Kappeler et al., supra note 4. 
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force, as some studies suggest,65
A small but growing number of legal scholars have begun 
to look beyond the constraints of the constitutional frame to 
what Harmon has described as “‘the law of the police’—the 
body of federal, state, local, and even international law that 
applies to police officers and departments and influences what 
they do.”
 police reformers interested in 
reducing police violence should advocate for a more educated 
police department. But a state’s collective bargaining rules may 
play a significant role in determining what forms of advocacy 
are likely to be effective. A police union—which represents cur-
rent officers, but not future officers—might favor providing tui-
tion assistance or paid leave so that current officers can pursue 
higher education, rather than changing hiring criteria for new 
officers or providing incentive pay for more educated officers, 
for example. 
66 Harmon provides a useful taxonomy of the law of the 
police, categorizing five ways that law affects police: as conduct 
rules, remedies, qualification and training requirements, laws 
governing police management and organization, and laws gov-
erning access to information about the police.67 Those categories 
are comprehensive, subsuming constitutional and statutory law 
at the federal, state, and local level and including both police-
specific laws and incidental regulation that can “interfere with 
policing reform” and “tax efforts to protect civil rights.”68
This taxonomy is a valuable addition to legal scholarship, 
but it would benefit from expansion. The fact that the inci-
dental regulation of policing avoids the deliberative process 
that safeguards societal interest-balancing makes policing-
neutral laws a particular concern. These laws create the status 
 
 
 65. James P. McElvain & Augustine J. Kposowa, Police Officer Character-
istics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 505, 
514 (2008) (finding that college-educated officers were less likely to use deadly 
force); Eugene A. Paoline III & William Terrill, Police Education, Experience, 
and the Use of Force, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 179, 179 (2007) (finding that 
officers with any amount of college education used less verbal coercion, while 
officers with a 4-year degree used less physical force). But see Lawrence W. 
Sherman & Mark Blumberg, Higher Education and Police Use of Deadly 
Force, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 317, 317 (1981) (finding that education level may not 
actually make a significant difference among officers who used deadly force). 
 66. Harmon, supra note 5, at 785. For example, legal scholars have identi-
fied concerns with police practices that do not implicate the Constitution, such 
as the use of informants, undercover work, and private policing. In this vein, 
academic work focuses on the subconstitutional law, or the lack of law, govern-
ing police. See sources cited supra note 7.  
 67. Harmon, supra note 5, at 802–08. 
 68. Id. at 799, 811. 
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quo, defining the police role in society and shaping the practic-
es that implicate policing’s unique functional and expressive 
role in society. 
II.  POLICING-NEUTRAL LAWS & INCIDENTAL EFFECTS   
In the preceding Part, I identified the conceptual problem 
with incidental regulation and explained that it has largely 
evaded academic scrutiny. In this Part, I provide concrete ex-
amples of policing-neutral laws of general applicability that 
have an incidental regulatory effect on policing. Police depart-
ments, after all, are not just providers of law enforcement ser-
vices. They are also employers, government agencies, and, for 
the most part, entities organized at the city or county level. As 
such, they are subject to laws that happen to include police 
agencies as constituents of a broader regulatory ambit. In the 
following pages, I demonstrate how these generally applicable 
laws incidentally affect the way that officers provide policing 
services. My goal is not to provide an exhaustive list of exam-
ples, but rather to provide useful illustrations of how laws that 
we do not associate closely with law enforcement may neverthe-
less impact the structure and form of policing. 
A. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
Every fall, tens of thousands of alumni and fans of Florida 
Agricultural & Mechanical University gather in Tallahassee for 
a week-long homecoming celebration. In addition to the football 
game, public service events, and private parties, one of the 
most popular parts of homecoming involves seeing and being 
seen. Many attendees arrive with spectacularly decorated vehi-
cles that boast stunning paint jobs, powerful stereo systems, 
and multiple television screens—I saw hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of vehicles at the five separate FAMU homecomings that 
I worked as a police officer, and my firm favorite was a bright 
pink late-1960s Chevrolet Chevelle, complete with chrome ac-
cents, twenty-five inch spinning rims, and a hood that had been 
playfully adorned with a very debonair picture of the Pink Pan-
ther (the cartoon character, not Inspector Clouseau). These 
aren’t just cars, they’re works of art, and the owners spend the 
evenings displaying them by driving up and down West Ten-
nessee Street, a major thoroughfare on the west side of town. 
Other attendees pull into roadside parking lots to laugh, drink, 
and enjoy the show. The crowds can be enormous, and traffic in 
that section of the city typically slows to a crawl. To manage 
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the event, the city police department and county sheriffs’ office 
typically call in all off-duty officers, cancelling regular days off. 
The surge in manpower is used primarily to control the heavy 
pedestrian and vehicle traffic. As evening rolls around and 
businesses start to close for the night, officers clear the area by 
going from parking lot to parking lot, systematically sweeping 
people into cars and cars onto the street. At the same time, 
east-bound traffic into the city is restricted as much as possible, 
and side streets are closed off so that out-bound traffic cannot 
turn off of West Tennessee Street. The effect is to push vehicle 
traffic west until it is beyond the city limits. Not to be outdone, 
the sheriffs’ office takes over and continues to funnel traffic 
away from the city, preventing cars from looping back as soon 
as they get beyond the city limits and forcing traffic into a 
neighboring county.69
The Tallahassee Police Department and Leon County Sher-
iffs’ Office, which take the lead in FAMU homecoming opera-
tions,
 
70 are in many ways emblematic of modern policing. Law 
enforcement in the United States is dominated by the more 
than twelve thousand police departments operated by munici-
pal governments71 and three thousand sheriffs’ offices orga-
nized at the county level.72 These agencies employ almost 
700,000 sworn officers—about eighty percent of all officers in 
the country73
 
 69. See Karl Etters, Law Enforcement Beefs Up Security for Homecoming, 
THE FAMUAN, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.thefamuanonline.com/news/law-enforc 
ement-beefs-up-security-for-homecoming-1.2643404#.UxOHPNiYaP9.  
—and the majority of those are the uniformed pa-
This description will be familiar to most residents of Tallahassee, but it is 
difficult to find an authoritative written account of either the event or the po-
lice response. The depiction that I have provided is based in large part on my 
own experience working as a police officer during five separate FAMU home-
comings. 
 70. Also involved are the FAMU Police Department, the Florida State 
University Police Department, the Florida Highway Patrol, and the Florida 
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Id. 
 71. REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 43, at 2. A small percentage of police de-
partments are “operated by a county, tribal, or consolidated city-county gov-
ernment.” Id. at 4. 
 72. Id. at 5. The term “sheriffs’ office” refers to an agency that is inde-
pendent of county government. See id. (“Some sheriffs’ offices that have been 
involved in consolidations of county and municipal governmental functions are 
classified as local police in the CSLLEA.”). Many state constitutions create 
sheriffs’ offices. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, ¶ III. A county sheriffs’ de-
partment, in contrast, is literally a department of, and thus subordinate to, 
county government. 
 73. REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 43, at 2. The remainder is made up of the 
120,000 agents who work for the seventy-three federal law enforcement agen-
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trol officers who are primarily responsible for responding to 
calls for service.74 With a few exceptions, policing is an intense-
ly local enterprise. State laws generally recognize the local na-
ture of policing by restricting officers’ extra-territorial authori-
ty. In Michigan, for example, city or county officers can act 
outside of their home jurisdictions only when working with the 
state police or with an officer from the foreign jurisdiction.75 In 
Georgia, city and county officers can take extra-territorial en-
forcement action only to the extent provided for in a contract or 
agreement between local government entities.76 Other states 
give local officers limited statewide jurisdiction, allowing them 
to make arrests for felonies77 or other offenses committed in 
their presence.78
Regardless of the idiosyncrasies of state law, which may 
give officers a greater or lesser degree of extraterritorial au-
thority, local police agencies are geopolitically centered. The 
Chief or Sheriff is politically accountable to the voting citizens 
of a single jurisdictional entity, either directly, in the case of 
elected officials, or indirectly, in the case of appointed offi-
cials.
 
79
 
cies, the 60,000 officers who work for state law enforcement agencies, the 
57,000 officers who work for the 1700 agencies with special jurisdiction and 
the 4000 officers employed by a handful of constable and marshals’ agencies. 
Id. at 1–2; BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS, 2008 at 1 (2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
fleo08.pdf. The agencies with special jurisdiction include both those that pro-
vide general police services to a special-purpose district or other geographic 
entity, such as a college campus or public transit system, and those that target 
only specific behaviors, such as beverage control or gaming enforcement. 
REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 
 It follows that local police departments and sheriffs’ of-
43, at 8. 
 74. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPART-
MENTS, 2007 at 6 (2010) (patrol officers make up between sixty and ninety 
percent of sworn employees in any given police department), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf; see also FRITSCH ET AL., su-
pra note 21, at 7 (“[P]atrol . . . consumes the bulk of officer personnel re-
sources.”). Other officers are in investigative, administrative, or specialized 
positions. See id. at 3–5; see also Stoughton, supra note 34, at 878–79.  
 75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.2a (2002).  
 76. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, ¶ III(b)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-13-30 (2011). 
 77. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. § 8953(6) (2007). 
 78. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23(a) (2013) (traffic offenses); CA. PE-
NAL CODE § 830.1(3) (2013) (any crime when “there is immediate danger to 
person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator”). 
 79. The assumption that local governments are concerned with their own 
citizens is a familiar one. See Alan Williams, The Optimal Provision of Public 
Goods in a System of Local Government, 74 J. POL. ECON. 18, 19 (1966). 
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fices focus their efforts on their home jurisdictions.80 How, then, 
can local government law affect police? Policing is, to a signifi-
cant extent, the exercise of control over space,81
Displacement is a viable strategy because we organize our 
units of local government according to what Richard T. Ford 
called “territorial jurisdiction”: “the rigidly mapped territories 
within which formally defined legal powers are exercised by 
formally organized governmental institutions.”
 but it is the ter-
ritorial nature of local jurisdiction that determines who exer-
cises control over which space. This, in turn, provides officers 
with a strategy or tactic: displacement. If a police officer can 
push a problem into a neighboring jurisdiction, it becomes 
someone else’s problem. 
82 Police ac-
countability, like police jurisdiction, stops at the city limits, fur-
ther “foster[ing] metropolitan fragmentation.”83
 
 80. This, of course, is a general statement that has any number of specific, 
if limited, exceptions. The New York Police Department’s infiltration into and 
surveillance of Muslim communities in New Jersey is a recent and particularly 
controversial example of extraterritorial action. Arguably, this was not police 
action; Andrew Schaffer, a deputy commissioner at the NYPD, defended the 
spying program in part by explaining that the officers involved were “‘not act-
ing as police officers in other jurisdictions.’” Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, 
NYPD Spying: How a 911 Caller Outed NYPD Surveillance of Muslims in New 
Jersey, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2012, 12:52 PM), available at http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/nypd-spying-new-brunswick-muslim 
-surveillance-new-jersey_n_1701340.html (emphasis added). 
 Displacing 
crime or disorder to a neighboring jurisdiction can be an effec-
tive strategy for local police. Think back to the example of 
FAMU homecoming that opened this subsection; the displace-
ment strategy is easily identifiable. Both the Tallahassee Police 
Department and the Leon County Sheriff’s Office push the 
heavy traffic out of their own jurisdictions to minimize both 
disruption and cost to the residents to whom they are answera-
ble. Displacement is not always so dramatic or visible; individ-
ual police officers may “deal with” problems caused by homeless 
people by informally ejecting them from a jurisdiction (or cer-
tain parts of one). Only last year, the ACLU accused the Detroit 
Police Department of displacing homeless people from the pop-
ular Greektown area of the city by, inter alia, dropping them off 
 81. STEVE HERBERT, POLICING SPACE: TERRITORIALITY AND THE LOS 
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–11, 21–23 (1997). 
 82. Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 843, 843 (1999). 
 83. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 167 (1999). 
  
2200 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2179 
 
outside the city limits,84 and media reports indicate that police 
in other cities have done the same thing.85
So far, I have focused on how local government law can af-
fect a particular jurisdiction by encouraging officers to displace 
problems into neighboring jurisdictions. But local government 
law, which governs the boundaries that separate both geo-
graphical territories and government services, can influence 
 Escorting a disorder-
ly homeless person to a sparsely populated area of the area, to 
the city limits, or even into a neighboring jurisdiction can be an 
attractive option for officers. Displacement can be an enticing 
short-term problem-solving technique; it takes little time, re-
quires no paperwork, and does not present much physical dan-
ger. The appeal is particularly strong when compared against 
making an arrest, which is often the only other short-term re-
sponse that officers have at their immediate disposal. Making 
an arrest, though, involves an increased element of risk and re-
quires spending time physically making the arrest, searching 
the arrestee, writing up the arrest paperwork, driving the ar-
restee to a booking facility (which requires more paperwork), 
impounding any evidence or personal property that the booking 
facility will not hold (which requires yet more paperwork), and 
getting a supervisor to sign off on all the paperwork. There is 
also the possibility of back-end costs, such as having to appear 
for a deposition or court proceeding and the threat of being 
sued. Compared to the time, effort, risk, and expense required 
by an arrest, displacement can be a bargain. Displacement can 
also be a more versatile tool; because it does not require proba-
ble cause, it can be used to deal with non-criminal problems 
and disorder even in situations when arrest would not be ap-
propriate.  
 
 84. Letter from Sarah L. Mehta, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties 
Union, to Barbara L. McQuade, U.S. Attorney (Apr. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/DOJ%20Complaint%20re% 
20Police%20Abuse%20of%20Homeless.pdf.  
 85. In 1994, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the City of Cleveland, alleg-
ing that the police department engaged in similar activity. Jean Taddie, Law-
suit Claims Homeless Dumped by Police, NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR 
THE HOMELESS (June 19, 2012, 10:28 AM), available at http://www.neoch 
.org/issue-10-articles/2012/6/19/lawsuit-claims-homeless-dumped-by-police 
.html. There have been more recent accusations of police removing homeless 
people from their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kathleen McGrory, Other Miami-Dade 
Cities Deny ‘Dumping’ Homeless People in Downtown Miami, MIAMI HERALD, 
July 1, 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/30/3479202/other-miami 
-dade-cities-deny-dumping.html; Rebecca Ferrar, Knox Sheriff Ends Homeless 
Transfers from Other Counties, KNOXVILLE NEWS, July 14, 2010, http://www 
.knoxnews.com/news/2010/jul/14/homeless-transfers-end/. 
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how police agencies will act in other ways. The permeability of 
jurisdictional lines and the possibility of consolidation and mu-
nicipal annexation can shift a department’s priorities and 
change interagency relationships. Imagine Circle City, located 
in the northwest corner of Square County. Both Square County 
and Circle City have their own police agency. If state law set up 
Circle City as an “independent city,” as it likely would in Vir-
ginia, the city limits would be a hard barrier to county authori-
ty; the Square County Sheriffs’ Office simply would not, and 
could not, have jurisdiction within Circle City, and vice versa.86 
In other states, such as Georgia, the City and County police of-
ficers could act in the opposite jurisdiction only to the extent 
provided for in a contract or agreement between Circle City and 
Square County.87 In yet other states, including Florida, Square 
County deputies might not even think about the Circle City 
limits; their authority would extend to every part of the county 
regardless of whether it happened also to be in the city.88 And 
in one state, Alabama, the Circle City police jurisdiction would 
actually extend beyond the city limits and into the county: a 
mile-and-a-half if there were less than 6000 residents in Circle 
City and three miles if there were more.89
At first blush, the picture is fairly simple. Either the agen-
cies largely ignore each other or they play off of each other in 
some fairly limited fashion. Perhaps the Square County Sher-
iff’s Office keeps its attention outside the city limits, or maybe 
the Circle City Police Department relies on the county to an-
swer calls for service within the city so that it can put more ef-
fort into providing specialized services like a traffic enforce-
ment unit or a vice crimes squad. Let us now make the picture 
both more complicated and more realistic. How would the de-
partments react if state law allowed for the consolidation of city 
and county services? If the county’s tax base was substantially 
lower than the city’s, we might expect the sheriffs’ office to 
strongly favor and pursue consolidation while the city police 
department actively opposed it. If the city was in a budget 
crunch, it may look into eliminating the police department and 
relying on the county to provide police services.
 
90
 
 86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 5.1-23 (2012). 
 In either case, 
 87. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, ¶ III(b)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-13-30 (2013). 
 88. See FLA. STAT. § 943 (2012). 
 89. ALA. CODE § 11-40-10 (2003). 
 90. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLIC-
ING SERVICES, THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN PO-
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the Circle City Police Department is put in the uncomfortable 
position of justifying its continued existence.91
Police agencies compete for legislator or popular approval 
by seeking to offer better, faster, or more services.
 And the agencies 
may respond in much the same way to the possibility of city ex-
pansion through annexation, though the roles may change. If 
Circle City’s expansion would cut into Square County’s opera-
tions, the sheriff’s office may be put on the defensive and seek 
to justify its continued service to constituents.  
92 They seek 
to increase visibility—always a priority—by putting more offic-
ers into patrol cars or reconfiguring the “beats” to decrease the 
number of roadway miles, houses, or businesses per patrol of-
ficer.93 They expand the range of services that they offer, either 
by loosening restrictions on the types of calls that patrol offic-
ers will respond to94
 
LICE AGENCIES 28–30 (2011), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/ 
Publications/e101113406_Economic%20Impact.pdf (providing examples of cit-
ies that have consolidated or eliminated police departments to mitigate budget 
deficits); see also Jesse McKinley, In a Beachside Tourist Town, a Wrenching 
Decision to Outsource, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
04/04/us/04halfmoonbay.html?_r=0 (reporting on the decision of the California 
city of Half Moon Bay to eliminate its police department due to budget issues). 
 or by creating special units such as a dedi-
cated community policing or crime prevention squad. They play 
 91. See, e.g., Caley Cook, Proposal to Merge Elko Law Enforcement Ser-
vices Draws Police Union Criticism, ELKO DAILY FREE PRESS, May 28, 2013, 
http://elkodaily.com/news/proposal-to-merge-elko-law-enforcement-services 
-draws-police-union/article_7f501aea-c7fc-11e2-a4f2-0019bb2963f4.html  
(reporting on police unions attempts to convince city council to preserve inde-
pendent city police force). 
 92. For a recent example, consider the arguments made by the chief of the 
Bergen County, New Jersey, Police Department, which has had to defend itself 
from consolidation proposals. Chief Brian Higgins argued that the county po-
lice increases patrol presence, engages in more community policing than other 
agencies, and provides services that other local police agencies do not, such as 
having a K-9 unit, bomb squad, and SWAT team. S.P. Sullivan, What Do 
County Police Do? Bergen Force, Under Fire, Explains Its Role at Forum, 
NJ.COM (Apr. 10, 2013, 5:00 AM), available at http://www.nj.com/bergen/index 
.ssf/2013/04/what_do_county_police_do_bergen_force_under_fire_explains_its_ 
role_at_forum.html. 
 93. ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOY-
MENT 49 (2009). 
 94. The Chicago Police Department, for example, will not dispatch an of-
ficer to citizen complaints about crime when “the offender is no longer at the 
scene and no one is in immediate danger.” Hal Dardick & Jeremy Gorner, 
More 911 Calls Won’t Get In-Person Response, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2013, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-03/news/chi-more-911-calls-wont 
-get-inperson-response-starting-sunday-20130202_1_Police-officer-crime-scene 
-officers. As a hypothetical, consider how long that policy would last if the CPD 
found itself in serious competition with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. 
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up their specialized knowledge of the community; one major 
selling point for any police agency, after all, is its ability to pro-
vide locally personalized service. Wilson noted that communi-
ties in Nassau County, New York, “often resist proposals to use 
[the county police] patrol services on the grounds that the local 
force keeps a sharper watch on things.”95 Other academic work 
on police consolidation suggests that communities value the 
perception of being connected to, and perhaps therefore exercis-
ing greater formal or informal control over, their local police 
department.96 Interagency competition can make agencies more 
responsive to local concerns, advancing the sense of personal 
connection that communities value.97
Competition between police agencies is largely beneficial, 
but there are potential drawbacks. To the extent that agencies 
become more responsive to local concerns, there is some ques-
tion about which concerns the agencies will respond to. Greater 
police responsiveness to the concerns of politically enfranchised 
citizens raises substantially the costs that policing imposes on 
lower socio-economic class members of the geographic commu-
nity. Competition can also prove expensive. If new money isn’t 
forthcoming from City Hall, an agency may increase some ser-
vices, such as the high-visibility patrol or traffic units, only by 
cutting costs in another, preferably less visible, area. When re-
sources come out of training or internal affairs, it can change 
how and when officers may search, arrest, and use force. When 
resources come out of investigations or joint-agency task forces, 
the end result may be more enforcement in one area—the low-
level misdemeanors that beat cops are more likely to run into—
 
 
 95. WILSON, supra note 1, at 212. 
 96. CASE STUDIES OF CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION: RESHAPING THE LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT LANDSCAPE 298–99 (Suzanne M. Leland & Kurt Thurmaier, 
eds. 2004); Elinor Ostrom et al., Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Po-
lice Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions, 33 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423, 
428 (1973) (providing examples of communites with extensive formal and in-
formal control over the local police force). 
 97. CONSOLIDATING POLICE SERVICES, AN INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF CHIEFS OF POLICE APPROACH 1 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=207077 (“Opponents [of consolidation] also 
assume that the personal nature of policing in their community will be lost, 
that response times may not be lowered, and that costs to the smaller commu-
nity may increase.”); see Edward J. Tully, Regionalization or Consolidation of 
Law Enforcement Services in the United States, NAT’L EXEC. INST. ASSOCS. 
(Jan. 2002), http://www.neiassociates.org/-consolidation-law-enforcement/ 
(suggesting that law enforcement organizations “give consideration to placing 
the consolidation of small, rural law enforcement agencies into regional police 
forces”).  
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and less in another area, such as domestic violence, vehicle 
theft, or fugitive apprehension. Here, the effects of territorial 
jurisdiction and interagency competition may be mutually rein-
forcing. For local law enforcement agencies, engaging in extra-
territorial action as part of a joint-jurisdiction task force is al-
most by definition non-essential. In the mid-2000s, for example, 
the San Diego Police Department responded to a budget-
induced manpower shortage by dramatically scaling back its 
participation in multi-agency activities, removing all of its of-
ficers from a Fugitive Task Force and an Auto Theft Task 
Force, and cutting down on the number of officers on other task 
forces.98 Competition can also reduce agency cooperation, mak-
ing them less likely to both share information about their own 
activities and about potentially regional problems. For a dra-
matic example, consider Lakeport, California, where a series of 
interagency disputes led the local sheriff’s office to cut off the 
city police department and several other agencies’ access to a 
county-maintained law enforcement records system, severely 
hampering police and prosecutor operations.99
The regulatory effects described in this section are not in-
tended to be all-inclusive; other aspects of local government law 
undoubtedly influence police in different ways.
 
100
 
 98. Will Carless, To Shore Up the Force, SDPD Bails Out of Task Forces, 
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Apr. 9, 2007), http://voiceofsandiego.org/2007/04/09/ 
to-shore-up-the-force-sdpd-bails-out-of-task-forces-2/.  
 The point, 
though, remains constant: local government law, which sets up 
jurisdictions and allows or forbids consolidation and annexa-
 99. Elizabeth Larson, Lakeport Police, Sheriff in Dispute Over Access to 
Law Enforcement Records System, LAKE COUNTY NEWS (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:18 
PM), http://www.lakeconews.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=30923: 
lakeport-police-sheriff-in-dispute-over-access-to-law-enforcement-records 
-system&Itemid=197. 
 100. Consider briefly the choice of Home Rule, which permits local govern-
ments the flexibility to adopt local ordinances so long as they are consistent 
with state and federal law, or Dillon’s Rule, which gives local governments on-
ly the powers expressly granted by state law. In a Home Rule state, police can 
engage with local political figures to advocate for legal changes that would re-
quire state legislation in a Dillon’s Rule state. See, e.g., Lori Hall, City Eases 
Up on Noise Ordinance, WESTLINN TIDINGS (Apr. 11 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.pamplinmedia.com/wlt/95-news/135789-city-eases-up-on 
-noise-ordinance (describing a local police department’s successful lobbying to 
change the time at which a city noise ordinance went into effect every even-
ing); Katie Lopez, Police Try Passing Synthetic Drug Ordinance for Second 
Time, VALLEYCENTRAL.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://www 
.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=851514#.UxDxgmhc_zK (describing a 
local police chief’s attempts to use local law to ban synthetic drugs). 
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tion, incidentally regulates police agency priorities, interagency 
interactions, and enforcement practices.   
B. STATE LABOR LAW & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In the late 1990s, the New York Police Department insti-
tuted a merit pay program that would have rewarded officers 
who had outstanding service records with a modest annual bo-
nus. In the aftermath of the brutal beating and rape of Abner 
Louima, then-Mayor Rudy Guiliani’s Task Force on Po-
lice/Community Relations101 recommended incentive pay as a 
way of “improving police morale and, ultimately, improving po-
lice-community relations.”102 The NYPD didn’t establish a 
straight-forward program that would simply reward top-
performing officers with increased pay, though.103 Instead, of-
ficers would be transferred, at least on paper, to a special unit. 
Officers in that unit would continue performing their normal 
duties, but would receive a bonus in the form of “special as-
signment differential” pay.104 Why? The city’s collective bar-
gaining agreement set a lock-step, seniority-based pay sched-
ule; pay depended on the length of employment, not officer 
performance.105 Officer assignments, however, were largely in 
the hands of management. Even structured as carefully as it 
was, the merit pay program had to be scraped after a challenge 
by the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, the union that rep-
resents rank-and-file officers.106 The acting union president ob-
jected to merit pay being “given out unilaterally by the Police 
Department,” declaring that “it should be negotiated by the un-
ion as to how it is distributed.”107
 
 101. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 3 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.usccr.gov/ 
pubs/nypolice/ch3.htm.  
 If the Task Force on Po-
 102. DEFLECTING BLAME: THE DISSENTING REPORT OF MAYOR RUDOLPH W. 
GUILIANI’S TASK FORCE ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS 43 (1998), availa-
ble at http://nycivilirights.org/wp-content/themes/civilrights/pdf/Report5.pdf.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Kit R. Roane, Merit Pay for Police Officers Is Overruled by Labor 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/03/ny 
region/merit-pay-for-police-officers-is-overruled-by-labor-board.html. 
 107. Id. The current collective bargaining agreement permits “performance 
compensation,” but requires the city to “notify and discuss with each affected 
union of its intent to pay such additional compensation and the individuals to 
be compensated.” CITY OF NEW YORK, PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIA-
TION 2002–2004 AGREEMENT 7 (2006) [hereinafter PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT 
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lice/Community Relations was correct about the positive effects 
of merit pay, the chance to improve moral and public relations 
was stymied not by a law aimed at shaping police behavior, but 
by the laws governing public sector unionization. 
Police unions, like other public unions, are relative new-
comers to the labor movement.108 They were initially viewed 
with distrust by traditional unions, which viewed them as “con-
trolled by forces inimical to the labor movement.”109 Their early 
progress was retarded by the disastrous Boston Police Depart-
ment strike of 1919, in which over a thousand officers—about 
two-thirds of Boston’s police force at the time—made a bid for 
higher pay and better hours by walking off the job or refusing 
to report for duty.110 Several days of rioting followed, resulting 
in three fatalities and a modest amount of property damage. 
Public opinion swung sharply against the striking officers, 
whom President Wilson denounced as having committed “a 
crime against civilization.”111 In the aftermath of the strike, na-
tional unions were cautious about representing officers, and the 
public, already generally skeptical of unions, was especially re-
luctant to support a unionized police force.112 Even today, most 
police organizations do not call themselves “unions”; instead, 
they use less politically charged labels like “associations,” such 
as the Police Benevolent Association and the Patrolmen’s Be-
nevolent Association, or “orders,” such as the Fraternal Order 
of Police.113
Times have changed, and today police unions enjoy broad 
legal and social support. Congress has left it to the states to de-
termine whether public-sector employees can engage in collec-
tive bargaining, and most have decided that they not only can, 
 
 
ASS’N 2002–2004 AGREEMENT] (extended by later memoranda of understand-
ing). 
 108. See Richard B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. 
ECON. LIT. 41, 43 (1986) (comparing the number of public sector unions).  
 109. WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 8 (6th 
ed. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Today in Labor History: 1919 Boston Police Strike, PEOPLE’S WORLD 
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.peoplesworld.org/today-in-labor-history-1919-bost 
on-police-strike/. 
 111. ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY OF NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 
1919–1920, at 122–34 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See generally Laura Huey & Danielle Hryniewicz, “We Never Refer to 
Ourselves as a Lobby Group Because ‘Lobby Group’ Has a Different Connota-
tion”: Voluntary Police Associations and the Framing of Their Interest Group 
Work, 54 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 287 (2012). 
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but should.114 According to a recent study by Harvard economist 
Richard B. Freeman, thirty-four states require government 
employers to engage in collective bargaining with public-sector 
employees, and another nine states permit, but do not require, 
public-sector collective bargaining.115 A few of the states that 
have banned collective bargaining for most public employees 
(Texas) or dramatically restricted it (Wisconsin and Indiana) 
have exceptions that permit—and in the case of Texas, explicit-
ly encourage—collective bargaining for police officers.116 Only a 
few states—Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Virginia—prohibit police unions from col-
lective bargaining.117 Indeed, the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
reports that most police officers work for agencies that engage 
in collective bargaining.118 These collective bargaining laws are 
policing-neutral; even when they are intended to specifically 
reach police agencies, the laws that require or permit unioniza-
tion are silent as to how police practices will or should be 
changed.119
Large law enforcement agencies typically bargain with 
multiple unions.
 
120
 
 114. The National Labor Relations Act, which gives private sector employ-
ees the right to collective bargaining, explicitly omits “the United States [and] 
any State or political subdivision thereof” from the definition of “employer.” 29 
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). Several federal laws that would give public safety em-
ployees—police officers, fire-fighters, and emergency medical personnel—the 
right to collective bargaining have been proposed, but none has been enacted. 
See The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, S. 3194, 111th 
Cong. (2009).  
 In some jurisdictions, officers can select 
 115. Richard B. Freeman & Eunice S. Han, Public Sector Unionism With-
out Collective Bargaining, 54 J. OF INDUS. REL. 386 (2012). 
 116. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 617.002 (2013); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 174.002(b) (2013); WISC. ACT 10 (2011); IND. ACTS 1001 (2013). 
 117. Even in states that do not provide for collective bargaining, police un-
ions exist have some influence on wages and working conditions. Cf. Freeman 
& Han, supra note 115. 
 118. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPART-
MENTS, 2007, at 13 (2010), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf 
(reporting that 38% of local police departments, which employ 66% of all offic-
ers, engage in collective bargaining with police unions).  
 119. The collective bargaining agreements that a government enters into 
with a police union are, of course, much less likely to be policing-neutral. The-
se contracts exist because of a policing-neutral legal framework, but, as we 
will see, they themselves are often closely concerned with police practices. 
 120. THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 
GOVERNANCE STUDY 17 (1998), available at http://www.seventy.org/Down 
loads/Policy_&_Reform/Governance_Studies/1998_Police_Governance_Study 
.pdf. 
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from among several unions, each of which negotiates with the 
city on its members’ behalf. The city of Dallas, Texas, for exam-
ple, negotiates both with a chapter of the Fraternal Order of 
Police and the Dallas Police Association. In other jurisdictions, 
local governments negotiate separately with various unions, 
each of which represents a different category of officer. The city 
of New York, for example, negotiates separately and has collec-
tive bargaining agreements with five unions: the Captains En-
dowment Association, the Lieutenants Benevolent Association, 
the Sergeants Benevolent Association, the Detectives Endow-
ment Association, and the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Associa-
tion.121 When a single locality includes multiple law enforce-
ment agencies, the situation can get even more complicated. 
The city of Los Angeles has separate collective bargaining 
agreements with eight different unions: the Police Command 
Officer’s Association, the Police Protective League, the General 
Services Police Officer’s Association, the Port Police Associa-
tion, the Port Police Command Offices Association, the Airport 
Police Command Officers’ Association, the Airport Peace Offic-
ers’ Association, and the Airport Police Supervisors’ Associa-
tion.122 Although this may seem like an extreme example, it an 
accurate representation of the status quo in large cities. The 
Philadelphia Police Department, though not unique, is highly 
unusual precisely because all of its officers are represented by a 
single union and covered by a single collective bargaining 
agreement.123
And what do these negotiated agreements look like? They 
typically govern a broad range of topics in excruciating detail. 
The Chicago Police Department contract with non-supervisory 
police officers—just one of four agreements with police employ-
ees
  
124—is 150 pages long.125
 
 121. Collective Bargaining Agreements, New York City, Office of Labor Re-
lations, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/olr/html/collective_bargaining/ 
police_contracts.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 Boston Police Department line of-
 122. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, DIRECTORY OF EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
REPRESENTATIVES AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT CITY EMPLOYEES (Apr. 2013), 
available at http://cityclerk.lacity.org/cps/PDF/DirectoryOfEmployeeOrgan 
.pdf. 
 123. THE COMM. OF SEVENTY, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT GOV-
ERNANCE STUDY 17 (1998), available at http://www.seventy.org/Downloads/ 
Policy_&_Reform/Governance_Studies/1998_Police_Governance_Study.pdf. 
 124. Chicago also has collective bargaining agreements with a sergeants’ 
union, a lieutenants’ union, and a captains’ union. Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, CITY OF CHICAGO, https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/ 
dol/supp_info/city_of_chicago_collectivebargainingagreements.html (last visit-
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ficers work under an agreement that, with amendments, totals 
sixty-three pages,126 while the line officers of the New York Po-
lice Department have a relatively modest twenty-eight page 
contract.127 These contracts can also be incredibly specific. One 
of the amendments to a Boston Police Department collective 
bargaining agreement, for example, describes the procedures 
that must be followed for annual drug testing of employees: it 
requires the collection of three hair samples, two of which are 
sent to a testing lab while the third remains securely stored by 
the department, and mandates that a sample will only test pos-
itive for cocaine if the initial test returns indicate a “[m]inimum 
of 5ng/10mg of cocaine; and . . . norcocaine (1ng); or 
Benzyleconine [sic] at a ratio of 5% or greater.”128
One of the most powerful aspects of police collective bar-
gaining agreements involves the power to file a grievance to 
challenge management decisions. The NYPD’s twenty-eight 
page agreement includes a “Grievance and Arbitration Proce-
dure” section that spreads over five pages and sets out a de-
tailed four-step process,
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ed Apr. 21, 2013). 
 while the grievance procedure sec-
tion of Chicago’s 150-page agreement takes up nine pages of 
 125. CITY OF CHICAGO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DE-
PARTMENT OF POLICE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE 
NO. 7 (2007), available at https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/ 
depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement2/FOP2007_2012FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter CHICAGO DEPT. POLICE AGREEMENT]. 
 126. CITY OF BOSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
CITY OF BOSTON AND BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASS’N, INC. (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.cityofboston.gov/labor/agreements.asp (follow “BPPA 2002–
2006 CBA” hyperlink) [hereinafter BOSTON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT]; CITY OF BOSTON, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, CITY OF BOSTON AND 
BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASS’N, INC., 2006–2007 (2007), available at 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/labor/agreements.asp (follow “BPPA 2006–2007 
MOA” hyperlink) [hereinafter BOSTON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
AMENDMENT 1]; CITY OF BOSTON, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, CITY OF 
BOSTON AND BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASS’N, INC., 2007–2010 (2007), 
available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/labor/agreements.asp (follow “BPPA 
2007–2010 MOA” hyperlink) [hereinafter BOSTON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT AMENDMENT 2].  
 127. CITY OF NEW YORK, PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASS’N 2002–2004 
AGREEMENT (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/olr/html/collective_ 
bargaining/police_contracts.shtml (follow “Police Officers, CBU 79, 2002–2004” 
hyperlink).  
 128. BOSTON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AMENDMENT 2, supra 
note 126, at 3. The agreement probably refers to Benzoylecgonine, a metabo-
lite of cocaine.  
 129. PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASS’N 2002–2004 AGREEMENT, supra note 
107, at 21–25.  
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long, single-spaced paragraphs.130 Both police unions and indi-
vidual officers can contest agency actions.131 Grievances typical-
ly first flow up the chain of command; if a front-line supervisor 
(e.g., a sergeant) disciplines an officer, the officer can appeal 
the decision to the next-higher commanding officer (e.g., a lieu-
tenant).132 After the chain of command is exhausted, most col-
lective bargaining agreements require continued disputes to be 
brought before a neutral arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators).133 
Most state laws make police arbitration binding,134 and judicial 
review of arbitration decisions is extremely limited. The Su-
preme Court has held that “[t]he refusal of courts to review the 
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbi-
tration under collective bargaining agreements”135 and that 
courts may not overturn an arbitrator’s decision even when 
there is “serious error.”136 Thus, “an arbitrator can be wrong on 
the facts and wrong on the law and a court will not overturn 
the arbitrator’s opinion.”137
How, then, does collective bargaining impact policing? 
There are at least three answers. First, unionization gives the 
rank-and-file a set of mechanisms—negotiations, grievances, 
and lawsuits—through which they can define the police role by 
prioritizing order maintenance, service provision, or law en-
forcement.
 
138 The choice of role has a range of effects, implicat-
ing “police-community relations, internal police operations, po-
lice morale, and the quality and quantity of law 
enforcement.”139
 
 130. CHICAGO DEPT. POLICE AGREEMENT, supra note 
 As it turns out, collective bargaining has a 
“significant positive relationship [to] . . . an emphasis on the 
125, at 11–19.  
 131. Id. at 12. 
 132. See, e.g., id. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 12–13. 
 134. AITCHISON, supra note 109, at 9 (explaining that binding arbitration 
offsets the disadvantage that comes from being denied the power to strike). 
 135. Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
 136. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
 137. AITCHISON, supra note 109, at 98. 
 138. At the risk of simplifying Wilson’s taxonomy, which built on prior so-
ciological work by Egon Bittner and others, “order maintenance” refers to a 
policing strategy where officers recognize, but do not prioritize, criminal en-
forcement as one possible peace-keeping mechanism. WILSON, supra note 1, at 
16–17, 30–31. Officers who prioritize “service provision” prefer informal ac-
tions over formal actions such as arrest. Id. at 200. This is in contrast to the 
“legalistic” policing style, which favors arrests and other formal actions over 
informal police responses to crime and disorder. Id. at 175–76. 
 139. John M. Magenau & Raymond G. Hunt, Police Unions and the Police 
Role, 49 HUM. REL. 1315, 1317 (1996). 
  
2014] INCIDENTAL REGULATION OF POLICING 2211 
 
law enforcement role.”140 Officers in unionized agencies are 
more likely to act legalistically, treating substantive criminal 
law as an expression of community norms and engaging in ag-
gressive criminal enforcement.141 In practical terms, officers 
who take a legalistic approach to law enforcement favor “offi-
cial” actions: “maintaining surveillance, cultivating informants, 
and apprehending and arresting suspects.”142 Officers in a legal-
istic department tend to make a high number of discretionary 
arrests and to encourage the civilians with whom they interact 
to invoke the formal criminal justice process rather than take 
advantage of informal, or formal but non-criminal, alterna-
tives.143 The causal mechanism that leads from unionization to 
a more legalistic approach to policing—or, to put it differently, 
exactly how police unions influence patrol policy—is not entire-
ly clear. Magenau and Hunt hypothesize that unionization “in-
crease[s] the political power of the rank and file” to essentially 
self-select the police role,144 but they do not examine in any 
depth why rank-and-file officers would collectively prefer a le-
galistic style. Perhaps because this style preserves officer au-
thority by using the relatively stable referent of “the law” to 
guide discretion rather than more fickle guidelines such as 
community norms or citizen concerns.145 To the extent that le-
galism is associated with police professionalism, another possi-
ble answer may be found in the research suggesting that public 
sector unions promote employee professionalism.146
Second, the grievance procedures that are often a central 
part of collective bargaining agreements both discourage and 
frustrate attempts to discipline individual officers.
 
147
 
 140. Id. at 1325. 
 An of-
ficer’s ability to contest adverse employment actions makes su-
pervisors less likely to impose disciplinary sanctions because 
while a supervisor faces a possible headache for not disciplining 
a misbehaving subordinate, they face a certain headache if they 
 141. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 172.  
 142. Magenau & Hunt, supra note 139, 1323 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 143. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 176.  
 144. Magenau & Hunt, supra note 139, at 1317. 
 145. See id. at 1318 (noting unionization allows officers to steer the police 
role towards law enforcement rather than service delivery). 
 146. See Freeman, supra note 108 (describing professional management as 
a “nonwage” benefit in the public sector as well as the private). 
 147. See, e.g., PATROLMEN’S BENEVOLENT ASS’N 2002–2004 AGREEMENT, 
supra note 107, at 21–25 (describing extensive grievance procedures). 
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do. As Harmon has pointed out in the civil service context, an 
officer who is left alone after having violated a policy or proce-
dure may commit a future infraction, which may injure some-
one, who may file a complaint or may find a lawyer to file a 
lawsuit, all of which may have an effect on the supervisor, but 
an officer who is reprimanded, transferred, suspended, or ter-
minated is both enabled and highly motivated to challenge the 
disciplinary action.148 This may be even more relevant to collec-
tive bargaining than in the civil service context.149
Even when discipline is imposed, the grievance procedures 
in collective bargaining agreements can frustrate or undermine 
the disciplinary measures. An empirical study that focused on 
discipline imposed by the Chicago Police Department in the 
early 1990s found that arbitrators, who had the final say in of-
ficer discipline according to a collective bargaining agreement, 
“routinely cut in half” the severity of disciplinary measures im-
posed by management.
 
150 A more recent investigative report by 
a newspaper in Florida, a state that lacks a strong civil service 
regime, found that thousands of officers from agencies across 
the state retained their jobs even after being arrested or impli-
cated in crimes due to “a disciplinary system that has been re-
shaped in [officers’] favor by the state’s politically influential 
police unions.”151 Grievance procedures can undermine supervi-
sory efforts to discipline officers even in light of a clear viola-
tion of law or policy. Consider two examples: An arbitrator in 
Pennsylvania reinstated an officer who had been fired for steal-
ing crack cocaine from a secure evidence storage area, conclud-
ing that the officer “had been sufficiently punished by the 10 
months he ha[d] been off work without pay.”152
 
 148. Harmon, supra note 
 An arbitrator in 
Ohio reinstated an officer who had been fired by a new police 
chief for “punching, kicking, and biting a fellow officer during a 
party” because termination was a more severe punishment 
5, at 797. 
 149. See AITCHISON, supra note 109, at 98 (“Law enforcement officers have 
had more favorable results appealing discipline through grievance arbitration 
procedures contained in collective bargaining agreements than those subject to 
civil service laws or internal departmental policies.”). 
 150. Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIM. 215, 216 (1998). 
 151. Anthony Cormier & Matthew Doig, Special Report: How Florida’s 
Problem Officers Remain on the Job, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec. 4, 
2011, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20111204/article/111209980. 
 152. Michael A. Fuoco, Officer Fired over Cocaine Reinstated by Arbitrator, 
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, June 25, 1991, at 6.  
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than had been imposed for similar behavior by previous admin-
istrations.153
Police agencies respond to the increased difficulty of disci-
plining officers in part by adopting extensive sets of rules, regu-
lations, policies, and procedures, which are laid out in expan-
sive tomes to provide officers with administrative due process 
by explicitly proscribing and prescribing any number of on-duty 
and off-duty behaviors.
 
154 Law enforcement agencies are “‘per-
manently flooded with petty military and bureaucratic regula-
tions,’”155 which are “typically codif[ied] . . . in shockingly great 
and verbose detail.”156 The NYPD’s Department Manual, which 
“serves as a guide for ALL members of the service” consists of 
an Administrative Guide, a Patrol Guide, and an Organization 
Guide that together total more than 1,600 pages,157 while the 
much smaller Madison Police Department in Wisconsin—an 
agency that is not even on the list of the top fifty largest police 
departments in the country—has a policy manual of just under 
400 pages.158 The rule books are all-encompassing to the point 
of being self-defeating; the rules “are so numerous and patently 
unenforceable that no one will (or could) obey them all.”159 As a 
result, policy and procedure failures are commonplace. As Peter 
Moskos wrote of the Baltimore Police Department, “[S]ome vio-
lations of the book of general orders are so ingrained as to be 
standard operating procedure.”160
 
 153. Arbitrator Reinstates Fired Police Officer, THE BLADE, Feb. 14, 2006, 
http://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2006/02/14/Arbitrator-reinstates-fired 
-police-officer.html. 
 The frequency of violations 
preserves the power of police administrators to discipline offic-
ers; they can always be written up for something. But ap-
proaching police discipline opportunistically leaves line officers 
 154. DAVID DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICE 
PRACTICES 4 (1997). Maintaining the integrity of officer discipline is not the 
only reason that departments adopt extensive written policies—others include 
the desire to limit officer discretion, the attempt to avoid civil liability, and 
agency accreditation requirements—but it remains an important one. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 223 (1990)). 
 156. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD 25 (2008). 
 157. N. Y. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE (2005) (emphasis in original). 
 158. TOWN OF MADISON POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL (2005). 
 159. DIXON, supra note 154, at 4–5 (quoting John Van Maanen, Working 
the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behavior, in THE POTENTIAL FOR 
REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83–130 (Herbert Jacob, ed. 1974)).  
 160. MOSKOS, supra note 156, at 25. 
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with the perception of arbitrary enforcement—paralleling the 
concerns that over-criminalization expands officer discretion.161
The threat of arbitrary discipline brings into focus the 
third effect of collective bargaining agreements: the creation or 
aggravation of intradepartmental tensions. Police insularity 
and the “us versus them” mentality that pervades law enforce-
ment is a widely remarked on phenomenon, but it is more nu-
anced than contemporary accounts typically credit.
 
162 In addi-
tion to the well-documented tension between law enforcement 
officers and the public, there is tension between sworn employ-
ees and civilian employees, line officers and command staff, 
and patrol officers and investigators.163 Friction exists in part 
because the mission goals of the constituent groups are not al-
ways well-aligned. For example, an officer who wants to stay at 
the scene of a burglary and write up the report while the de-
tails are fresh in his mind will be frustrated by an insistent 
dispatcher who wants him to be available to respond to the 
next incident on the list of pending calls, while a dispatcher 
who lives by the credo of rapid response policing will be frus-
trated by an officer “milking” a call (staying on-scene longer 
than necessary just to catch a break). Similarly, line officers 
may resent what they view as unnecessarily onerous depart-
ment procedures adopted by police managers who are overly 
concerned with legal liability and out of touch with life on the 
street, while police managers are exasperated by officers who 
will not voluntarily adopt new practices, refuse to support new 
programs, and lose track of bigger picture concerns like com-
munity perceptions of legitimacy. These tensions affect officer 
behavior. For example, Moskos describes how a management-
imposed initiative to increase arrests actually decreased the 
number of arrests even by officers who were known for making 
many arrests.164
Collective bargaining also exacerbates these tensions by 
eliminating a potential source of solidarity when multiple col-
lective bargaining units negotiate with a city or county gov-
 
 
 161. See generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomena, 54 AM. 
U. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
 162. See, e.g., HARRY W. MORE & LARRY S. MILLER, EFFECTIVE POLICE SU-
PERVISION 179 (7th ed. 2014) (“Insularity erects protective barriers between 
the police and the public and creates an ‘us versus them’ mentality.”). 
 163. See generally Theodore N. Ferdinand, Police Attitudes and Police Or-
ganizations, 3 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 46 (1980) (investigating 
the effect of roles, ranks, and other factors in interdepartmental relations). 
 164. Id. at 152–54. 
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ernment, which is particularly common in large agencies. Re-
call that Los Angeles negotiates with eight different police un-
ions, New York with five, and Chicago with four.165 This creates 
two sources of conflict between officers of different unions. The 
first exists because a city or county government has finite re-
sources that must be spread among the different groups. Thus, 
the various unions’ negotiations may be seen as a zero-sum 
game in which benefits to one group of police employees accrue 
only at the expense of others, undermining internal cohesion.166
The second source of conflict exists because the position 
taken by one collective bargaining unit can undermine the de-
mands of another. Take a recent case from Chicago, in which 
the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represents line of-
ficers, demanded a twelve-percent raise over two years.
 
Two unions that are both demanding a significant pay increase 
may dispute which group has the better claim. 
167 The 
Police Sergeant’s Association, on the other hand, requested a 
more modest two-percent annual raise—a move that took the 
FOP president “aback” and that could have “undercut the 
FOP’s bargaining position.”168 The FOP president responded by 
publicly advocating for the members of the Sergeants’ Associa-
tion “to reject the proposed contract” that the sergeants’ union 
had endorsed169 and by instructing line officers, via a newslet-
ter, to “please politely lobby your sergeant to vote” to reject the 
contract.170
 
 165. See supra notes 
 If the sergeant’s union had accepted the two-percent 
120–24 and accompanying text. 
 166. This view has also been at the heart of the often-contentious relation-
ship between many police and firefighters’ unions. For a recent example of this 
debate, see Dillon Collier, San Antonio Police, Fire Unions Fight over Possible 
Benefit Reductions, KENS 5 (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.kens5/news/San 
-antonio-police-and-fire-unions-digging-in-for-fight-over-possible-benefit 
-reductions-236125451.html.  
 167. Fran Spielman, City, Police Sergeants Union Strike Deal on Raises, 
Pensions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, http://www.suntimes.com/news/ 
metro/18157927-418/city-police-sergeants-union-strike-deal-on-raises-pensions 
.html. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Hal Dardick, Chicago Police Sergeants Reject Emanuel Contract Offer, 
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-11/news/ 
chi-chicago-police-sergeants-reject-emanuel-contract-offer-20130311_1_ 
sergeants-union-chicago-police-sergeants-pension-payments. 
 170. Michael Shields, President’s Report, F.O.P. NEWS (F.O.P. Chi. Lodge 
No. 7), Mar. 2013, at 1, available at http://chicagofop.org/newsletter/2013/ 
032013news.pdf (emphasis in original). 
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raise, the concession would have given the city a bargaining 
advantage vis-à-vis the officers’ union.171
The conflict between management and the rank-and-file, 
which is aggravated by aspects of collective bargaining, con-
tributes to low morale, which has a deleterious effect on officer 
performance.
 
172 It, along with the authority of line officers to 
challenge departmental actions, also makes top-down adminis-
trative reforms difficult to implement because of the reduction 
in “buy-in” from front-line supervisors and the rank-and-file.173 
Officers have contested changes to how they will be evaluat-
ed,174 how their actions are monitored,175 how patrol shifts are 
staffed,176 and even how they must dress.177
State labor law requires or permits collective bargaining, 
and that, like local government law, can have unanticipated 
side-effects on police practices. When collective bargaining 
gives line officers more authority to define the police role, offic-
  
 
 171. To use another example, the union representing police detectives in 
New York “grudgingly” agreed to eliminate a contract provision that required 
the police department to wait forty-eight hours before interviewing officers ac-
cused of misconduct, but only because the sergeants’ union had already made 
the same concession. Amy Waldman, Detectives’ Union Agrees to Drop Disput-
ed Rule, N. Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/17/ 
nyregion/detectives-union-agrees-to-drop-disputed-rule.html.  
 172. See MOSKOS, supra note 156, at 145–55. 
 173. See Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POL. & SOC. 23, 25–27 
(2008) (describing resistance on the part of rank-and-file officers). 
 174. In 2012, the union representing officers at the Raleigh Police Depart-
ment was involved in a public dispute with the Police Chief over officer per-
formance evaluations. Thomasi McDonald, Raleigh Police Union: New Evalua-
tion Process Is ‘Thinly Veiled’ Quota System, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 13, 
2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/07/13/2197551/raleigh-police-union 
-new-evaluation.html. 
 175. A police union in Columbus, Ohio has come out strongly against the 
city’s use of real-time GPS tracking of police vehicles, arguing that the city has 
an obligation to negotiate with the union about how the devices can be moni-
tored and used for disciplinary purposes. Lucas Sullivan, Fire, Police File 
Grievance Over GPS Tracking of Vehicles, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 
2013, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/04/24/fire-police 
-make-gps-gripes-official.html. 
 176. For example, a police union at the Denver Police Department has re-
cently spoken against a staffing arrangement that it says will slow officer re-
sponse times and make backup less available. Sadie Gurman, Denver Police 
Union: Chief’s Staffing Plan Is Dangerous, DENVER POST, May 21, 2013, http:// 
www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_23293931/denver-police-union-chiefs 
-staffing-plan-is-dangerous. 
 177. See, e.g., Cecilia Chan, Phoenix Police Union Sues City over Uniform 
Change, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 5, 2013, http://www.azcentral.com/commun 
ity/phoenix/articles/20130605phoenix-police-union-sues-city-over-uniform 
-change.html. 
  
2014] INCIDENTAL REGULATION OF POLICING 2217 
 
ers embrace a legalistic patrol style that results in higher ar-
rests and more aggressive criminal enforcement. The power-
shifting effect of collective bargaining is, to a great extent, ap-
parently inconsistent with the hierarchical “chain of command” 
structure that police agencies adopt. The resulting friction ad-
versely affects officer performance. 
C. FEDERAL RACE DISCRIMINATION LAW 
In a study of college students, participants watched a 
grainy video that depicted two police officers making an ar-
rest.178 The viewers could tell that the suspect was black, and 
they could identify the officers by race, but the quality of the 
recording was too poor to provide other details.179 Each partici-
pant saw the suspect offer a low level of resistance and watched 
the officers respond with a moderate amount of force.180 They 
were then asked “to estimate the degree of violence and illegali-
ty (i.e., brutality) employed by police in the arrest they had 
viewed.”181 Though the participants did not know it, the arrest 
was staged; one set of participants saw a video of two black of-
ficers, another saw two white officers, and a third saw one 
black officer and one white officer.182 Although the officers’ ac-
tions were identical in the three videos, participants reported 
“significantly greater violence and illegality” when the arrest-
ing officers were both white than when one or both of the ar-
resting officers were black.183
This study demonstrates that the perception of police legit-
imacy depends in part on who does the policing, and race is a 
particularly relevant characteristic. As a 1967 presidential 
commission report put it, “The occupying-army aspects of pre-
dominantly white . . . police patrol in predominantly Negro 
neighborhoods have been many times remarked; the actual ex-
tent of the alienation thereby enforced and symbolized is only 
now being generally conceded.”
 
184
 
 178. Jack Levin & Alexander Thomas, Experimentally Manipulating Race: 
Perceptions of Police Brutality in an Arrest: A Research Note, 14 JUST. Q. 577, 
581 (1997). 
 On the other hand, having 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. In each video, the “officers” were the same two campus security 
guards wearing light- or dark-colored panty hose over their heads. Distance 
and poor-quality recording turned the mask into the officer’s “race.” Id. at 579.  
 183. Id. at 582. 
 184. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
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only minority officers policing minority neighborhoods “smacks 
of segregation and seems to ratify existing racial barriers.”185
The representation of minorities in policing is better now 
than it historically has been; minorities now make up about a 
quarter of all state and local officers, roughly matching the to-
tal percentage of minorities in the national population.
  
186 But 
the national picture is deceptive. There is variation with re-
spect to different minority groups, for example,187 and most lo-
cal law enforcement agencies are not racially representative of 
the population they serve.188 Large urban police departments 
are more likely to have a patrol force made up of a dispropor-
tionately high number of minority officers,189 while agencies 
that serve less than 100,000 civilians have relatively few mi-
nority officers.190 Yet existing research suggests that a large 
percentage of the public, particularly minority communities, 
would generally favor a racially representative local police 
force.191
 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 62–63 (1967), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf. 
 A study by Ronald Weitzer, a sociologist at George 
Washington University who specializes in police/minority rela-
 185. Weitzer, supra note 25, at 320.  
 186. REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 43, at 14; LINDSAY HIXSON ET AL., U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010 3 (2011).  
 187. Blacks make up less than 12% of state and local officers and over 13% 
of the national population; about 10.3% of officers are Latino, compared to 
16.7% of the broader population; Asians make up 2% of officers, but 5% of the 
population; and about 0.7% of officers are American Indians, who make up 
1.2% of the population. REAVES, CENSUS, supra note 43, at 14. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer, Can Police Be Reformed?, 4 CONTEXTS, 2005, 
at 22 (listing five other cities—“Atlanta, Detroit, El Paso, Miami, [and] Wash-
ington”—that have a disproportionately minority patrol force); Tamer El-
Ghobashy, Minorities Gain in NYPD Ranks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2011, http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576066302323002420 
.html (reporting on the New York City Police Department); J. David Goodman, 
More Diversity in New York City’s Police Dept., but Blacks Lag, N. Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/nyregion/more-diversity-in 
-new-york-citys-police-but-blacks-lag.html (reporting on the percentage of mi-
nority police recruits).  
 190. REAVES, supra note 74, at 14.  
 191. Weitzer, supra note 25, at 313–14. The lack of proportional racial rep-
resentation is a theme that runs through criminal justice scholarship, and has 
been explored in the context of juries and trial court judges, among others. 
See, e.g., Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury 
Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 
1037–50 (2003); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Im-
partiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 102–
04, 143–45 (1997).  
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tions, suggests that even more people may prefer racially di-
verse police squads; that is, there is a preference that the 
groups of officers who patrol various neighborhoods should in-
clude members of different races.192 The benefits seem to be 
threefold; Weitzer describes a “moderating effect,” in that offic-
ers of different races serve to check and balance each other; an 
“edifying effect,” in that officers of different races can facilitate 
better personal perceptions; and “symbolic benefits” that reduce 
the perception of White “occupation” by expressing a more posi-
tive social message.193 Thus, regardless of whether minority of-
ficers do things differently than white officers,194
Changing the racial make-up of a police department, how-
ever beneficial it may be, is a difficult proposition. Affirmative 
action programs are legal, if not uncontroversial, but they are 
not particularly effective at increasing minority representation 
on a police force.
 racial factors 
play a role in the perception of police legitimacy. 
195 More direct action is legally suspect. In Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court held 
that Equal Protection demands strict scrutiny of race-conscious 
government actions, which must be “precisely tailored to serve 
a compelling governmental interest.”196
 
 192. Weitzer, supra note 
 Applying Bakke, courts 
have generally permitted law enforcement agencies to take 
“race into account to advance the operational needs of the po-
25, at 320.  
 193. Id.  
 194. See, e.g., Robert A. Brown & James Frank, Race and Officer Decision 
Making: Examining Differences in Arrest Outcomes Between Black and White 
Officers, 23 JUST. Q. 96, 96 (2006) (finding that officer race influences the deci-
sion to arrest); Rod K. Brunson & Jacinta M. Gau, Officer Race Versus Macro-
Level Context: A Test of Competing Hypotheses About Black Citizens’ Experi-
ences with and Perceptions of Black Police Officers, CRIM. & DELINQUENCY 
(print version forthcoming), available at http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/ 
2011/02/17/0011128711398027 (exploring the influence of officer race in form-
ing police perceptions); Scott H. Decker & Russell L. Smith, Police Minority 
Recruitment: A Note on Its Effectiveness in Improving Black Evaluations of the 
Police, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 387, 389 (1980) (investigating the effect of minority re-
cruitment); Ivan Y. Sun & Brian K. Payne, Racial Differences in Resolving 
Conflicts: A Comparison Between Black and White Police Officers, 50 CRIM. & 
DELINQUENCY 516 (2004) (examining differences in behavior between Black 
and White officers in interpersonal conflict resolution).  
 195. Jihong Zhao & Nicholas Lovrich, Determinants of Minority Employ-
ment in American Municipal Police Agencies: The Representation of African 
American Officers, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 267, 274–75 (1998). The size of the Black 
population in a given locality is much more strongly correlated with minority 
representation than the existence of an affirmative action program. Id. at 275.  
 196. 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).  
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lice department by achieving diversity.”197
determin[e] whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate [by] 
look[ing] to several factors, including the necessity for the relief and 
the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the 
relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship 
of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of 
the relief on the rights of third parties.
 But race-based hir-
ing or promotional quotas are difficult to justify; even when an 
agency seeks to “remedy[] past and present discrimination by a 
state actor,” a court will  
198
Courts have been reluctant to approve of a racial quota, 
typically doing so only when it is included as a provision of a 
consent decree.
 
199
In addition to the legal challenges to creating a racially 
representative police force or command structure, police agen-
cies are unlikely to be able to purposefully avoid single-race 
squads of patrol officers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits employers from using race or color to make deci-
sions about the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.”
 
200 The EEOC Compliance Manual is more detailed, ex-
plaining that “[w]ork assignments must be distributed in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. This means that race cannot be a 
factor in determining the amount of work a person receives, or 
in determining who gets the more, or less, desirable assign-
ments.”201
 
 197. Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1981); see also 
Petit v. City of Chi., 352 F.3d 1111, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting the police de-
partment’s operational need for diversity satisfied the “compelling interest” 
requirement).  
 
 198. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167, 171 (1987).  
 199. See id. at 151 (approving a condition of a consent decree that required 
the Alabama Department of Public Safety to allocate fifty percent of corporal 
promotions to black state troopers); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 
1158 (1994) (approving a condition of a consent decree that required the Mem-
phis Police Department to allocate at least twenty percent of all promotions to 
black officers, while remanding the case on other grounds); Rutherford v. City 
of Cleveland, 179 F. App’x 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2006) (approving a condition in a 
consent decree that required the Cleveland Police Department to hire three 
minority officers for every four non-minority officers hired).  
 200. 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 201. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-VII(B)(1) (2006), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf. 
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III.  RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS WITH INCIDENTAL 
REGULATION   
In the preceding Part, I used state labor law, local govern-
ment law, and federal race discrimination law to demonstrate 
how policing-neutral laws can incidentally affect officer con-
duct. In this Part, I offer a three-part response to the potential 
problems of incidental regulation: identification, evaluation, 
and response. Identification may be prospective predictions, 
forecasting the effects of a policing-neutral law on police prac-
tices prior to enactment, or retrospective analysis that deter-
mines the incidental effects of existing law. Once the incidental 
effects are identified, it is possible to make an informed deci-
sion about whether to accept them. If the incidental effects are 
undesirable, either a separate offset or a police-specific carve-
out may be appropriate. 
A. IDENTIFYING INCIDENTAL EFFECTS  
The best way to avoid the potential pitfalls of incidental 
regulation may be to avoid it altogether by predicting, to the 
extent possible, the effects of any given law on the police. The 
acquisition of information can be costly; as Matthew Stephen-
son has observed, there is a systemic “underinvestment in in-
formation” that arises from the agency dynamic of public deci-
sion-making.202 Before one can talk sensibly about how law- and 
policy-makers might obtain more information about the inci-
dental regulatory effects of proposed laws, one must address 
the threshold question of when—that is, in what contexts—
they should make the attempt.203
 
 202. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institution-
al Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1427–31 (2011). 
 There is an easy answer—
 203. Academically, of course, it would be ideal if policymakers considered 
carefully the effects of every law on police, but this is obviously unrealistic. 
Federal lawmakers propose thousands of bills every year, some action is taken 
on about a thousand, and several hundred are enacted as law. Josh Tauberer, 
Kill Bill: How Many Bills Are There? How Many Are Enacted?, GOVTRACK.US 
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/blog/2011/08/04/kill-bill-how-many-bills 
-are-there-how-many-are-enacted/. State statistics are not as clear, but if they 
lag behind, it might not be by much; in 2011, the Governor of California, in a 
state which already has a cap on the number of bills each legislator can pro-
pose, asked state lawmakers to propose fewer bills. See Michael J. Mishak, 
State Lawmakers Are Being Urged to Scale Back the Number of Laws They 
Propose, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/06/ 
local/la-me-legislature-20110226. Though many of those bills seem unlikely to 
affect officer behavior or police legitimacy—to use an example from California, 
a statutory restriction on what can be called “extra virgin olive oil” appears 
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they should do so when the error costs of failing to identify in-
cidental effects are likely to outweigh the costs of identifica-
tion—but that is hardly a practical limiting principle. Prelimi-
narily, we might start by identifying vectors through which 
policing-neutral laws seem most likely to influence police prac-
tices. The examples in this Article provide a starting point, as 
we have seen how laws that impact political accountability, the 
balance of power between line officers and management, and 
public perceptions of police legitimacy can affect police practic-
es. There are clearly other vectors through which policing-
neutral, non-criminal laws impact policing,204
How, then, does one identify a law’s incidental effects on 
policing? The first place to look for improvements would be 
within the legislative process itself at both the state and federal 
level. To provide a greatly simplified explanation of the legisla-
tive process, bills are proposed and assigned to committees for 
evaluation, which may further assign them to subcommittees 
for review. In systems that permit multiple committee assign-
ments—as in the United States House of Representatives and, 
to a lesser extent, the United States Senate—proposed legisla-
tion that would encompass police agencies could be assigned by 
the parliamentarian to a Police Practices Committee, in addi-
tion to the other committee(s) with jurisdiction.
 and, once a body 
of research develops, it may be possible to form some educated 
assumptions about which laws are more likely to affect unique 
policing practices.  
205
 
highly unlikely to impact police practices—the possibility of attenuated inci-
dental effects remains. See id. 
 Committee 
involvement does not have to end when a law is enacted. As the 
ongoing debate about the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act demonstrates, legislators care about the effects of en-
acted legislation. Positive political theory tells us that legisla-
 204. Civil service laws, labor laws, lobbying laws, and local government 
human resources ordinances or policies all come to mind as possible targets for 
further exploration, as do non-criminal laws that target disorder, such as local 
code enforcement and zoning laws. See generally NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, 
ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN 
AMERICA (2009). 
 205. The question of jurisdiction is a challenging one for systems that eval-
uate committee jurisdiction by referring only to the face of proposed legisla-
tion. By definition, laws that have only an incidental effect on policing are un-
likely to explicitly evoke law enforcement. The study of committee jurisdiction 
in the federal system is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally DAVID C. 
KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 
(1997). 
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tors can and do build “fire-alarm” and other monitoring mecha-
nisms into regulatory statutes.206 Moreover, as both political 
scientists and legal scholars have explained, legislative com-
mittees can be a mechanism for on-going monitoring of the un-
intended consequences of laws.207
Direct legislative attention to the problem of incidental 
regulation may be the first best solution, but changing proce-
dural rules can be a daunting task. A more direct solution that 
could lend itself to the same result would be the creation, by 
the legislature or the executive, of a special advisory commit-
tee.
 Both mechanisms could be 
used to identify laws that have a significant incidental effect on 
police behavior. The committee or subcommittee could hold 
hearings to forecast or review the impact of the law on officer 
behavior and police legitimacy and could make recommenda-
tions for modification based on its findings. 
208 Federal advisory committees must “be fairly balanced in 
terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be 
performed,”209 and state and local advisory committees are typi-
cally created to provide subject matter expertise and policy 
suggestions, making them a natural meeting point for academ-
ics and researchers, police experts, and civil liberty advo-
cates.210
 
 206. Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 95 (1992); Murray J. Horn & 
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational 
Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 505 (1989); 
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Ad-
ministrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 434 (1989). 
 Once appointed, the committee can itself identify likely 
legislation, conduct research, and hold open hearings to identi-
fy the extent to which a particular law incidentally effects polic-
ing. In addition to its information-gathering function, the com-
mittee would also provide a source of contact for interest groups 
 207. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competi-
tion to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1456, 1490–94 (2003). 
 208. In the federal system, the Federal Advisory Committee Act permits 
the establishment of an advisory committee by statute, executive order, or 
agency authority. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2. 
 209. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5. 
 210. The committee charter can establish membership criteria such as min-
imum qualifications or required expertise. See WENDY R. GINSBERG, RE-
SEARCH SERV., R40520, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW 17 
(2009).  
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with a stake in police practices.211
Academics and interest groups, too, have a role in the iden-
tification of laws that will have an incidental regulatory effect 
on police, a sphere that is currently almost completely occupied 
by police lobbyists. Sociologists and criminologists have sought 
to create a model of police behavior by isolating the correlates 
of policing style and officer discretion. Social scientists can find 
the correlates of police behavior while legal scholars, with an 
expertise in law and reduced reliance on grant funding, can 
identify the legal foundations of those correlates to facilitate a 
more thorough understanding of the law’s emergent effects on 
policing. Legal scholars can bring their expertise to bear by 
identifying the types of legal decisions that have significant, if 
incidental, regulatory effects on the police. Those conclusions 
could then be used by interest groups to target proposed legis-
lation for in-depth review, with the findings published and pro-
vided to law- and policy-makers. 
 Once compiled, the commit-
tee could provide its findings to legislators.  
Regardless of the mechanism—legislative committees, ad-
visory committees, or independent academics—the goal is iden-
tifying, to the extent possible, the incidental effects of legisla-
tion on the police. Like the Congressional Budget Office, which 
provides formal “cost estimates” for most bills approved by a 
full House or Senate committee,212
B. EVALUATION 
 predictions about the impact 
of legislation on officer behavior and police legitimacy would 
seek to estimate the “cost”—to liberty and social cohesion—of 
proposed legislation and to provide that information to legisla-
tors. Once lawmakers have been informed of the side-effects of 
any given proposal, the problem of incidental effects can be 
squarely addressed. 
Once identified, the emergent effects of law can be subject-
ed to normative evaluation. In some cases, law-makers may de-
cide that they approve of the way that a policing-neutral law 
shapes officer behaviors. This discussion, when it happens, is 
about the relative costs and benefits of specific police practices. 
Perhaps, for example, the type of interagency competition fos-
tered by the territorial approach to local government jurisdic-
 
 211. Cf. Stoughton, supra note 34 (discussing the promise and problems of 
relying on interest groups for information about police practices). 
 212. Our Processes, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/our 
-processes (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
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tion is socially desirable in that it both encourages the compet-
ing agencies to be more responsive to citizen concerns and in-
creases the quantity and quality of police services.213
C. ADDRESSING INCIDENTAL REGULATION 
 That de-
termination, if made, would resolve my skepticism over the in-
incidental effects of local government law; although I might 
disagree with the conclusion, there would be little argument 
that the decision was reached in a more informed, deliberative 
manner than the current norm regularly provides for. Policing 
and police behaviors are, of course, deeply controversial, and in 
a great many cases, I suspect, the effects of incidental regula-
tion will defy any universal assessment, leaving reasonable 
people to disagree about whether to accept the resulting police 
practice.  
If normative evaluation leads to the conclusion that a given 
law pushes police to act in a way that society would prefer to 
avoid, the problem of incidental regulation must be ad-
dressed.214
I will address both carve-outs and offsets momentarily, but 
it is worth acknowledging that the choice of mechanism is, to 
some extent, a question about how we prioritize competing val-
ues. In any given case, we must balance the underlying justifi-
cation of the policing-neutral law against the values implicated 
by the police practice at issue. In some cases, society may be 
firmly wedded to the policy embodied in a particular law, so 
wedded, for example, that we are unwilling to allow police de-
partments to make race-conscious patrol assignments because 
the benefit of increased public legitimacy is outweighed by the 
 If the incidental effect of any given law on police 
needs to be mitigated, there are two mechanisms available: po-
lice-specific carve-outs and independent offsets. A police-
specific carve-out is aimed at treating the underlying legal 
cause of the undesirable police behavior by exempting police 
from some or all of the underlying law as a way to avoid the in-
cidental regulatory effect. An independent offset, in contrast, is 
intended to treat the symptom—the police behavior itself—
rather than the underlying legal cause, so instead of exempting 
police from a generally applicable, policing neutral law, an off-
set would seek to compensate for the law’s incidental effects. 
 
 213. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 214. Take, for example, the reductions in public perceptions of police legit-
imacy; few lawmakers would argue that reducing public trust in the police is a 
good thing. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text. 
  
2226 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2179 
 
various costs.215
1. Police-Specific Carve-Outs 
 In such a case, an offset would seem more ap-
propriate and politically salable than a carve-out. Because the 
justifications for policing-neutral laws that have some inci-
dental regulatory effect are varied, there is no single normative 
framework that would permit straight-forward, consistent se-
lection of corrective mechanism. The justification for each law 
must be weighed individually against the benefits of changing 
police behavior before a rational decision about creating a po-
lice-specific carve-out or an independent offset can be made.  
Law enforcement agencies and officers are the subject of 
statutory or common law exemptions from any number of oth-
erwise applicable laws. What we think of as paradigmatic po-
lice powers are themselves exceptions from generally applica-
tion legal prohibitions.216 Where a private citizen would be 
generally subject to civil and criminal sanctions for false im-
prisonment, kidnapping, or battery, the police officer is author-
ized, and perhaps even obligated, to infringe on the rights of 
others by detaining, arresting, and using force.217 The familiar 
sight of a police car with its lights flashing and siren wailing as 
it blows through a red light on the way to some emergency is 
possible only because officers are, under the right conditions, 
exempted from traffic laws.218
 
 215. The costs could include problems with morale, allegations of “reverse 
racism,” and a reduction in public support in certain communities. 
 Certain police operations—
 216. DIXON, supra note 154, at 64.  
 217. In the right circumstances, of course, a private civilian can exercise 
some aspect of police powers; citizen’s arrest remains part of the common law, 
individuals can use force in self-defense, and businesses can take steps, in-
cluding detaining and searching, to protect their property. 
 218. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1104 (McKinney 2011). Police offic-
ers are unlikely to get ticketed for on-duty traffic violations even when they 
are not operating in “emergency response” mode; to the extent that they are 
sanctioned at all, they are commonly subject only to internal discipline. See 
Josh Sweigart, Some Public Workers Run Red Lights Freely, DAYTON DAILY 
NEWS (July 17, 2012), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/some 
-public-workers-run-red-lights-freely-1/nPwbZ/; Jeremy Rogalski, Crashes 
Caused by Cops Leave Victims Wanting Justice, KHOU.COM (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.khou.com/news/ITeamHPDAccidents-149102875.html; Rene 
Stutzman & Scott Powers, Day 1: Cops Crash Often, Ticketed Rarely, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 2012, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012 
-02-11/news/os-police-car-crashes-totals-mainbar-20120211_1_officers-crash 
-cops-crash-officer-mark-maupin. Even off-duty officers often avoid being tick-
eted for traffic violations, benefitting from “professional courtesy.” See Michael 
Dresser, When Police Let Officers Skate, Respect for Traffic Law Tanks, 
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-02 
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principally undercover investigations—involve officers facilitat-
ing or committing acts that would ordinarily result in criminal 
sanction.219 Most police agencies are constantly available to re-
spond to emergencies, and police employees are generally ex-
empted from various aspects of a locality’s human resources 
code, such as the expectation that city employees’ work shifts 
will coincide with typical business hours.220 And in the context 
of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for civil 
damages when a government official infringes on an individu-
al’s federal statutory or constitutional rights, the Supreme 
Court has held that police officers can use the common law “de-
fense of good faith and probable cause” even though the statute 
itself provides no such exceptions.221
In the context of addressing the effects of incidental regu-
lation, police-specific carve-outs would exempt police agencies 
from some aspect of the pertinent law. At its extreme, the con-
cept of police-specific carve-outs would take the form of a clear 
statement rule.
 
222
 
-06/features/bs-md-dresser-getting-there-02-09-20110204_1_police-officer-law 
-enforcement-professional-courtesy. 
 Imagine a statute that dictates, “No law, 
rule, or regulation shall be read to affect law enforcement agen-
 219. Joh, Breaking the Law To Enforce It, supra note 7, at 159; CHARLES R. 
SWANSON ET AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 629 (7th ed. 2000); GARY T. MARX, 
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 62–68, 17–77 (1988); JOHN 
M. MACDONALD & JERRY KENNEDY, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF DRUG OF-
FENSES, 113 (1983); George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police 
Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 203, 216 (1975). Sometimes these acts can be 
fairly egregious. See, e.g., John Diedrich and Raquel Rutledge, ATF Uses 
Rogue Tactics in Storefront Stings Across Nation, JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 
2013, http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/atf-uses-rogue-
tactics-in-storefront-stings-across-the-nation-b99146765z1-234916641.html.  
 220. See, e.g., CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 
13 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . the typical workweek is 40 hours, 
consisting of five workdays of eight hours each. The City’s official business 
hours are from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.”). For more on police scheduling, see 
WILLIAM W. STENZEL & R. MICHAEL BUREN, POLICE WORK SCHEDULING: 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PRACTICES (1983). For more recent work that 
builds on the foundation laid by Stenzel and Buren’s earlier text, see ERIC J. 
FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT (2009). 
 221. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). The Court’s decision in 
Pierson was the bedrock upon which the modern doctrine of qualified immuni-
ty was built. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The 
Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1467–
68 (1989); Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Offi-
cials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 
YALE L. J. 126, 130 (1985). 
 222. For more on clear statement rules as canons of statutory construction, 
see CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180–82 (2011). 
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cies unless a contrary intention is clearly stated therein.” Such 
an approach would, of course, be painfully over-inclusive; a 
blanket exception that, inter alia, permits police officers to 
make jams and preserves with more than five different types of 
fruits, despite the general regulatory prohibition on doing do,223
How might this play out in practice? If descriptive research 
identified that the collective bargaining provisions that allow 
officers to challenge disciplinary proceedings result in agencies 
adopting a legalistic style of policing, and if normative consid-
eration concludes that legalistic policing is problematic—
perhaps because it results in too many arrests and insufficient 
police engagement with the community—the pertinent state 
law carve-out could take grievance procedures off the collective 
bargaining table, perhaps replacing them instead with a state-
wide regulation that applies uniformly to all law enforcement 
agencies.
 
would do little to alter the dynamic of modern policing, to say 
nothing of the administrative headache of adding statements of 
applicability to a huge body of laws and regulations or the judi-
cial headache of determining when a statement is clear enough. 
The more measured approach would be for lawmakers to direct 
police-specific carve-outs at individual statutes, rules, or doc-
trines. A particular carve-out could be complete, exempting po-
lice agencies from the relevant statute entirely, but it need not 
be. Partial carve-outs could exclude police agencies from cer-
tain, specified aspects of the statute. In either case, the carve-
out restricts the scope of a law that would otherwise regulate 
the police in some way. 
224
Collective bargaining is hardly the only area of law where 
police-specific carve-outs could change the incidental regulatory 
effect of law on policing. Recall the problem of police legitimacy 
and the possibility that public perceptions could be improved by 
changing the racial composition of the police force to either 
more closely mirror the community or to ensure that officers do 
  
 
 223. 21 C.F.R. § 150.160(2) (2012). 
 224. At least seventeen states have adopted some version of a Law En-
forcement Officer Bill of Rights, which provide procedural protections to offic-
ers under administrative or criminal investigation. AITCHISON, supra note 
109, at 244. I have not identified any state that allows police to engage in col-
lective bargaining but prevents them from bargaining about grievance proce-
dures. State law can exempt certain aspects of employment from collective 
bargaining as well as setting default rules that collective bargaining can modi-
fy. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08 (2007). 
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not work in single-race groups.225 Constitutional and statutory 
anti-discrimination law present legal hurdles to the otherwise 
obvious solution: establish hiring and promotional quotas or 
take race into account when making duty assignments. Police-
specific carve-outs are possible. In the statutory context, Con-
gress could amend Title VII to permit law enforcement agencies 
to take race into account in the limited context of assigning pa-
trol officers only for the purpose of improving the public’s per-
ception of legitimacy. Constitutionally, bolstering perceptions of 
police legitimacy could possibly be considered a “compelling 
government interest,” allowing narrowly tailored efforts to sur-
vive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.226
2. Independent Offsets 
 
In some cases, there may be powerful reasons to not create 
police-specific carve-outs to generally applicable laws. In the 
anti-discrimination context, for example, perceptions of reverse 
discrimination may actually undermine rather than bolster the 
public image of the police or reduce officers’ morale to such an 
extent that it negatively impacts their performance,227
I use the phrase “independent offset” to describe the rela-
tionship of the response to the law that exerts an incidental 
regulatory effect on police. A response is “independent” in that 
it does not affect the scope of the applicable law. Instead of ex-
empting police from a generally applicable law, a response can 
“offset” the incidental effect of that law through other means, 
compensating for the undesirable aspects of incidental regula-
 counter-
acting the effects of increased police legitimacy. And practical 
considerations, including the relatively low probability of the 
Court accepting police legitimacy as a compelling government 
interest or the political difficulty of amending state law in a 
contentious area like collective bargaining, may militate 
against law enforcement exemptions. When police-specific 
carve-outs are not available or are not appropriate, concerns 
about the incidental regulation of police could be addressed 
with an independent offset. 
 
 225. See supra Part II.C. 
 226. I acknowledge that tinkering with anti-discrimination law is likely to 
be a controversial proposition; I submit this truncated example only to demon-
strate the potential range and scope of police-specific carve-outs to generally 
applicable laws. Though the question is worthy of more extended analysis, 
that is a task for future work. 
 227. Cf. NATHAN F. IANNONE ET AL., SUPERVISION OF POLICE PERSONNEL 
194 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the importance of officer morale). 
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tion by way of a countervailing law or policy. In short, rather 
than attempting to change police behavior by modifying the 
underlying cause—a law that incidentally regulates police—an 
independent offset seeks to compensate for the symptom it-
self—the effect of incidental regulation. Like police-specific 
carve-outs, the concept of offsets already has a place in modern 
law. At least seventeen states have adopted some form of a Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, for example, which pro-
vides procedural protections to officers being investigated for 
disciplinary or criminal infractions beyond those enjoyed by the 
public at large or other government employees.228 Officers re-
main subject to administrative and criminal sanctions for mis-
feasance and malfeasance, but they benefit from special securi-
ties that are commonly justified by the need to offset an 
officer’s heightened “vulnerab[ility] to false accusations” and 
safeguard his reputation,229 which is particularly relevant to 
certain aspects of policing.230
Consider, for example, the incidental effect of territorial ju-
risdiction in permitting, and even encouraging, displacement as 
a policing strategy. Recall the example of Florida Agricultural 
& Mechanical University’s Homecoming, where the city and 
county police push heavy traffic out of their jurisdiction, and 
the on-going accusations that police departments are address-
ing their local transient population by relocating homeless peo-
ple, dropping them off beyond the city limits or even in neigh-
boring jurisdictions.
  
231
 
 228. AITCHISON, supra note 
 An independent offset might seek to 
discourage police from engaging in displacement-oriented ac-
tions, but without making any attempt to change the essential 
109, at 244; see also VA. CODE §§ 9.1-500–07 
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42.28.1–17 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 112.532 (2008).  
 229. See, e.g., FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, http://www.grandlodgefop.org/legislative/ 
issues/leobr/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 230. An officer with a reputation for dishonesty can jeopardize prosecutions 
with which he is involved. See Lisa A. Judge, Disclosing Officer Untruthfulness 
to the Defense: Is a Liars Squad Coming to Your Town?, THE POLICE CHIEF 
(Nov. 2005), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuse 
action=display_arch&article_id=744&issue_id=112005 (cited in Harmon, su-
pra note 5, at 805 n. 181). An officer thought to be dishonest may also face ad-
ditional pressure from judges (and, when relevant, prosecutors) when submit-
ting arrest or search warrant applications. Cf. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., 
Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chi-
cago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 105–12 (1992) (describing the 
mixed responses of prosecutors and judges to “boilerplate” language in war-
rant applications and the possibility of perjurious testimony). 
 231. Supra note Part II.A. 
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nature of local territorialism. For example, a state could re-
quire local governments to reimburse neighboring jurisdictions 
for the costs of dealing with specific disturbances that their po-
lice force had intentionally displaced.232 Returning to the prob-
lem of police legitimacy, state and local governments, as well as 
individual police agencies that are aware of a racial deficit in 
police legitimacy, can pursue alternative means of improving 
public perceptions from increasing cultural awareness training 
to redoubling community outreach and education efforts. Simi-
larly, one could imagine legal and administrative ways to coun-
terbalance unionized agencies’ tendency toward the legalistic 
policing and the high number of arrests that it produces. For 
example, an agency or locality could seek to foster a perception 
of arrests as a solution of last resort, an indication of some 
greater social failure rather than a metric on which officers are 
favorably evaluated.233 State law could also provide alternatives 
to arrest by expanding police authority; giving officers the abil-
ity to leverage some legal, forward-looking, but non-criminal 
measures—imagine writing someone a “ticket” that requires 
them to attend substance abuse counseling or anger manage-
ment classes234
Independent offsets present some of the same challenges as 
police-specific carve-outs; regardless of the corrective mecha-
nism, after all, the effect of incidental regulation first must be 
identified and evaluated. To be effective, a given tactic must be 
reasonably calibrated to the incidental effect that it is intended 
to offset, which may require a similar degree of ex post verifica-
tion and, when necessary, modification. Unlike police-specific 
—could drive down officers’ reliance on the for-
mal criminal justice system.  
 
 232. I use the qualifiers “specific disturbances” that are “intentionally dis-
placed” in anticipation of the observation that many aspects of policing, includ-
ing targeted enforcement efforts and aggressive patrol, can effectively displace 
crime by raising the costs of committing criminal acts in a given jurisdiction, 
pushing would-be criminal actors into neighboring jurisdictions with lower 
costs. This “general displacement” essentially involves the voluntary reloca-
tion of criminal actors to avoid interacting with the police. In contrast, the 
“specific displacement” that I am most concerned with involves police-initiated 
involuntary relocation. For a general overview on the concept of general dis-
placement, see René B.P. Hesseling, Displacement: A Review of the Empirical 
Literature, 3 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 197 (1994); Robert Barr & Ken Pease, 
Crime Placement, Displacement, and Deflection, 12 CRIME & JUST. 227 (1990).  
 233. See Stoughton, supra note 34. 
 234. In practice, this could resemble diversion strategies commonly used by 
prosecutors’ offices. See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 656–58 (2002). 
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carve-outs to generally applicable laws, though, independent 
offsets are not necessarily statutory. They may be creatures of 
state or local law, but they can just as easily be grounded in 
city or departmental policy. Effecting a sublegal change may 
avoid some of the pitfalls of legislative modification, particular-
ly when statutory carve-outs would be aimed at laws that, like 
collective bargaining, can evoke strong bipartisan sentiment. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article illuminates a largely overlooked aspect of how 
society regulates police officers. Scholars conventionally seek to 
answer questions about policing by examining direct legal regu-
lation, particularly constitutional doctrines, and a range of sub-
legal factors. These approaches have advanced our understand-
ing of police, but they are incomplete. Policing is also subject to 
incidental regulation, the unexpected side-effects of laws that 
are not intended to have any specific impact on core police func-
tions. There are reasons to be particularly concerned about the 
incidental regulation of law enforcement. The standard tools of 
policing—surveillance, search, detention, arrest, and interroga-
tion—inherently infringe on sensitive liberty and privacy inter-
ests. Police also play special roles in modern society, both ex-
plicitly, such as public safety officers, and implicitly, as 
uniformed representatives of the legal order. In short, the val-
ues and interests implicated by policing should lead us to be 
skeptical of legal decisions that have an unconsidered regulato-
ry effect. 
Using three examples from three different legal areas—
local territorial jurisdiction, state labor law, and federal anti-
discrimination law—I explain how the incidental regulation of 
policing shapes officer behavior in unanticipated ways. As units 
of local government, police agencies are subject to state laws 
that govern geopolitical boundaries and the relationship be-
tween municipalities and counties. Though these laws are not 
intended to govern interagency relations, they can establish a 
competitive dynamic that can result in an expansion of high-
visibility police services or cooperation that lends itself to a re-
gional focus on crime prevention, detection, and investigation. 
The nature of territorial jurisdiction, which inherently limits 
the range of people to whom an agency is politically accounta-
ble, can also encourage officers to engage in a strategy of specif-
ic displacement; pushing crime and disorder into neighboring 
jurisdictions is safer and cheaper than handling it at home.  
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As employers, law enforcement agencies are subject to both 
state collective bargaining law and federal anti-discrimination 
law. One is intended to correct the imbalance of power between 
low-level employees and management; the other, to protect in-
dividual rights by ensuring that similarly-situated people are 
treated equally without regard to superficial personal charac-
teristics. Neither appears intended to have a specific effect on 
policing, but both do. Collective bargaining changes the police 
role by emphasizing a legalistic approach to patrol character-
ized by aggressive criminal enforcement and a high number of 
arrests. It also creates and exacerbates internal tensions—
between sworn and civilian employees, rank-and-file officers 
and front-line supervisors, and sometimes even between rank-
and-file officers aligned with different unions—that can nega-
tively affect officer morale and performance. Anti-discrimin-
ation law, which constrains how employers assign job duties, 
also has the incidental effect of inhibiting efforts to improve the 
public’s perception of police legitimacy, particularly in minority 
communities. When the police are viewed as illegitimate, vio-
lent crime increases and civilian cooperation with the police de-
creases; both phenomena prompt a negative response from the 
police themselves, changing the way that officers interact with 
community members. 
These examples demonstrate that the law of the police is 
far more expansive than laws about policing, but they are just a 
starting point. Policing-neutral laws of general applicability 
play an important role in defining the police role, in part by al-
lowing officers a voice in the development of criminal proce-
dure, substantive criminal law, and criminal justice policy.235
 
 235. Huey & Hryniewicz, supra note 
 
Consider how non-criminal laws are leveraged in a way that fa-
cilitates the exercise of police authority; within property law, 
for example, an individual’s right to exclude and the associated 
right to delegate that right to the police have played a major 
113, at 288 (discussing the “thin liter-
ature” on “the politics of the police”). For example, police unions and lobbyists 
are among the staunchest opponents of marijuana legalization. See Lee Fang, 
The Top Five Special Interest Groups Lobbying to Keep Marijuana Illegal, RE-
PUBLIC REPORT (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.republicreport.org/2012/mari 
juana-lobby-illegal/. A brief glance at the website of only one police interest 
group––the International Association of Chiefs of Police––reveals thirty-five 
separate “projects” on topics from juvenile justice to violent extremism to pro-
tecting civil rights. Projects, INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, http:// 
www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/Projects (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).  
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role in anti-vagrancy and other tough-on-crime initiatives.236 
Other laws can change police tactics by increasing or decreas-
ing the costs of detecting criminal activity,237 by offering alter-
natives to arrest,238 or by providing civil enforcement options 
that complement traditional police action.239 Yet other laws im-
pact the dynamics of criminal enforcement by changing short-
term priorities. For example, zoning law often pushes bars and 
nightclubs into a fairly close proximity, and state or local law 
frequently requires those establishments to close at a set 
time.240 The mass exodus of people at “closing time” creates a 
large number of potential problems in a compressed period of 
time, which officers respond to, in part, by engaging in informal 
order maintenance rather than formal criminal enforcement so 
as to avoid getting “tied up” by making arrests. Each of these 
has an incidental, and often unexpected, effect on policing.241
 
 236. Under what is commonly known as the “Trespass Affidavit Program,” 
private property owners can authorize police officers to investigate instances 
of suspected trespass on their property and, upon their own initiative and 
without further consultation of the property owner, to ban people from the 
property. The now-infamous “Stop and Frisk” policy of the New York Police 
Department arose, in large part, in the context of “vertical patrols” of apart-
ment buildings that are authorized by private agreements between landlords 
and police, permitting officers to investigate and expel or arrest suspected 
trespassers on their own initiative. See THE NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY’S OFFICE, Trespass Affidavit Program, http://manhattanda.org/ 
trespass-affidavit-program (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (describing the Trespass 
Affidavit Program as “a valuable tool” for law enforcement). 
 
 237. San Francisco, for example, requires building permits for front-yard 
fences over three feet high. S.F. PLANNING DEP’T, Fences—Residential, 
http://www.sf-planning.org/index.aspx?page=2811#applying (last visited Apr. 
10, 2013).  
 238. In Washington, for example, localities may not prohibit religious or-
ganizations from providing “temporary encampments for the homeless,” ex-
panding the range of options for officers dealing with a homeless individual 
even when that person has been banned from government-run shelters or 
when those shelters are full. WASH. REV. CODE. § 36.01.290 (2010). 
 239. LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 76–
77 (2005) (discussing the use of civil code enforcement and shifting the onus of 
compliance to property owners and landlords). 
 240. California state law, for example, forbids the sale of alcohol between 2 
a.m. and 6 a.m. of the same day. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE. § 25631 (2008). In 
Atlanta, bar service ends at 2:30 a.m., with certain exceptions for businesses 
in a “special entertainment district.” ATLANTA, GA CODE § 10-209(c)-(d) (2012). 
 241. In this Article, I introduce the discussion of incidental regulation of 
police through examples of linear cause-and-effect relationships; this law re-
sults in that effect on police. It is possible, in some circumstances, that inci-
dental regulation has important emergent properties in that the effect on po-
lice behavior is an irreducible attribute of the web of laws to which police are 
subject. See Keith Sawyer, Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philosophy 
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The problems presented by the incidental regulation of po-
licing are not insurmountable. Lawmakers and interest groups 
need to pay special attention to proposals that would include 
the police as constituents of a broader regulatory ambit, fore-
casting the impact on police practices to the extent possible. 
The need to better identify incidental effects of legislation re-
mains even after a law is enacted, and legal scholars and other 
academics are uniquely situated to do so. Once a law’s results 
are described and normative decisions made about their worth, 
undesirable effects can be addressed in two ways: police-specific 
carve-outs could exempt police from generally applicable laws, 
either in part or in whole; and independent offsets could seek to 
compensate for the effects of incidental regulation through law 
or policy without upsetting the existent legal background. 
There is an on-going academic discourse that seeks a more 
comprehensive understanding of police practices. The inci-
dental regulation of policing is a necessary part of that conver-
sation. By taking a more comprehensive view of the legal envi-
ronment in which police operate, we can more fully understand 
how the law shapes officer behavior. That understanding, in 
turn, can pave the way to a tighter regulatory regime and more 
effective police reform. 
 
 
 
of Mind and Some Implications for Sociological Theory, 107 AM. J. SOC. 552, 
552 (2001) (discussing the concept of “emergence” and its use in philosophy, 
sociology, and economics). 
